Generally Characterised (སྤྱི་མཚན་, sāmānyalakṣaṇa)
The conceptual counterpart to the specifically-characterised. In dharmakirti’s ontology, the generally characterised is everything that is not a causally effective individual — universals, conceptual constructs, commonsense properties, and abstract entities.
Definitions
Dharmakīrti (Pramāṇavārttika)
མཚན་གཞི་ (Definiendum): སྤྱི་མཚན་ (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) — generally characterised phenomenon
མཚན་ཉིད་ (Definiens): That which is unable to perform a function (དོན་བྱེད་མི་ནུས་པ་), lacking identity conditions in space, time, and entity — defined as the negation of the specifically-characterised
མཚོན་བྱེད་ (Illustration): Universals such as “cowness” (བ་ལང་ཉིད་), “fireness”; space (ནམ་མཁའ་); cessation (འགོག་པ་)
“Those [phenomena] which are able to perform a function are here [said to be] ultimately existent. Others are said to be conventionally existent. Those two [types of phenomena are] specifically and generally characterised.”
The definition is primarily negative: the generally characterised is what the specifically characterised is not. Phenomena that do not possess their own characteristics cannot perform any function and depend for their existence on the conceptual synthesis of individuals. They are superimposed by our conceptual schema and are not part of the fabric of reality (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 67–68).
Source: pramanavartika 3:3; dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 62, 67–68
Key Features
- The object of thought and inference (not perception)
- Not causally effective — exists merely as imputation (བཏགས་ཡོད་, vijñaptisat) superimposed on real things
- Permanent (རྟག་པ་) in the technical sense: not causally produced, not undergoing change in its own essence (though it comes into and goes out of existence with changes in the impermanent things on which it is labelled)
- Examples include: space, cessation, all conceptual constructs, universals
Gelug vs. Sakya
For Sakya antirealists the generally characterised is a conceptual fiction and nothing more. For Gelug realists it is a permanent phenomenon that exists in a lesser way, superimposed on causal reality but not simply nothing. The Gelug position needs that middle status, since without it the objects of inference would be nothing at all; what the middle status amounts to is the difficulty Dreyfus presses under the moderate realist’s predicament on problem-of-universals.
Consequences of Rejection
Three of Dharmakīrti’s arguments outside ontology run through this rejection (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 233–234):
- Against ātman: a permanent soul could not be causally efficacious
- Against a creator god: a permanent being could not have created the world
- Against caste: since jāti (object-type) also means “caste,” the argument that object-types are unreal provides strictly ontological grounds for rejecting the brahmanical caste system
Scope: Gelug vs. Non-Gelug
The traditions differ over which phenomena count as metaphysical entities, and the list is longer on the non-Gelug side (berzin-science-of-mind, Basic Distinctions among Cognitive Objects):
Gelug metaphysical entities (static phenomena) include:
- Conceptual categories (སྤྱི་): “apple,” “orange”
- Absences (མེད་པ་): the absence of a peel on a peeled apple
- Space (ནམ་མཁའ་): the absence of anything tangible that could obstruct material objects
- The selflessness of persons
Commonsense objects, collection syntheses, and kind syntheses are not in the Gelug list of metaphysical entities — they are objective entities.
Non-Gelug metaphysical entities include everything above, plus:
- Commonsense objects (e.g., a commonsense apple): they are mental syntheses of spatial, sensorial, and temporal parts, not objectively real
- Collection syntheses (tshogs-spyi): e.g., a forest as a whole is a static mental synthesis
- Kind syntheses (rigs-spyi): e.g., “dog” as a type is a static mental synthesis
- A conventional identity as “an apple” mentally labeled on any of the above
On the non-Gelug account, commonsense objects still exist and still grow on trees and can be eaten (cause and effect operate). But they are validly known only by the conceptual cognition that mentally constructs and labels them. Their mental-holograms in conceptual cognition are objectively real (objective entities), but the commonsense objects themselves are merely metaphysical entities.
The Two Ontological Types of Categories (Gelug Only)
Gelug analysis distinguishes two types of categories (berzin-science-of-mind, Objects in Non-Conceptual Cognition):
Nonstatic syntheses (categories that are functional phenomena):
- Collection syntheses (ཚོགས་སྤྱི་) — wholes as imputations on spatial/sensorial/temporal parts
- Kind syntheses (རིགས་སྤྱི་) — the types of objects that a specific individual item is an instance of
- These are object exclusions (དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་) — nonstatic objective entities, cognizable non-conceptually or conceptually
Static categories (categories that are nonfunctional phenomena):
- Audio categories (སྒྲ་སྤྱི་)
- Meaning/object categories (དོན་སྤྱི་)
- These are mental exclusions (བློའི་གཞན་སེལ་) — cognized only conceptually
On the non-Gelug account, collection and kind syntheses collapse into the same class as meaning/object categories — all are static metaphysical entities.
Sources
- dreyfus-recognizing-reality — Chapters 2–5
- westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti — consequences of rejecting objects in general (pp. 233–234)
- berzin-science-of-mind — Gelug vs. non-Gelug scope of metaphysical entities; two ontological types of categories; the treatment of commonsense objects