Specifically Characterised (རང་མཚན་, svalakṣaṇa)
The foundational ontological category in Dharmakīrti’s system. The specifically characterised is the real — that which exists as a causally effective individual, in contrast to the generally-characterised (སྤྱི་མཚན་, sāmānyalakṣaṇa), which is conceptually constructed and unreal.
Definitions
Dharmakīrti (Pramāṇavārttika)
མཚན་གཞི་ (Definiendum): རང་མཚན་ (svalakṣaṇa) — specifically characterised phenomenon
མཚན་ཉིད་ (Definiens): That which has determinate existence in space, time, and entity (ཡུལ་དང་དུས་དང་ངོ་བོ་ངེས་པ་) and is causally effective (དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ་, arthakriyāsamartha)
མཚོན་བྱེད་ (Illustration): [not given explicitly in source]
The specifically characterised is defined by three sets of identity conditions: definite location in (1) space, (2) time, and (3) entity. Whatever has these conditions is a real individual — momentary, causally effective, and the object of perception alone. This ontology is sharply antirealist: universals, commonsense enduring objects, and all abstract properties are excluded from reality (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 63–68).
Source: pramanavartika 3:3; dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 63–68
Ge-dün-drup
མཚན་གཞི་ (Definiendum): རང་མཚན་ (svalakṣaṇa) — specifically characterised phenomenon
མཚན་ཉིད་ (Definiens): དོན་དམ་པར་དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ་ (paramārthataḥ arthakriyāsamartha) — that which is ultimately able to perform a function
མཚོན་བྱེད་ (Illustration): Blue (སྔོན་པོ་)
“The defining property of the specifically characterised is that which is ultimately able to perform a function (དོན་དམ་པར་དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ་, paramārthataḥ arthakriyāsamartha).”
Ge-dün-drup refuses to define the specifically characterised in terms of definite spatio-temporal location, because having a determinate existence in space and time is not an exclusive property of specifically characterised phenomena — it is shared by all phenomena (including permanent ones). Similarly, being common (concomitant with other phenomena) cannot define the generally characterised, since some real phenomena (like a jar) are concomitant with their particulars. The criterion of causal effectiveness (དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ་) is shared across Ge-luk thinkers, though with different formulations (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 116).
Source: dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 116
Kay-drup (Ocean of Reasoning)
མཚན་གཞི་ (Definiendum): རང་མཚན་ (svalakṣaṇa) — specifically characterised phenomenon
མཚན་ཉིད་ (Definiens): That thing which exists from its own side according to its own uncommon essence without being imputed by a conceptual cognition (རང་ངོས་ནས་གྲུབ་པ་)
མཚོན་བྱེད་ (Illustration): A jar, blue colour, fire
“That thing which exists from its own side according to its own uncommon essence without being imputed by a conceptual cognition.”
Kay-drup refuses to identify reality with individuality. Unlike Dharmakīrti (as read by Sa-gya scholars), he does not define the specifically characterised in terms of strict determinate existence in space, time, and entity. The key criterion is existing from its own side (རང་ངོས་ནས་གྲུབ་པ་) without being merely the product of conceptual imputation. This allows commonsense objects and even universals to qualify as specifically characterised — they exist from their own side provided they are not artificially constructed by thought. This reflects the moderate realism of the Ge-luk tradition (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 117).
Source: dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 117
Gyel-tsap
མཚན་གཞི་ (Definiendum): རང་མཚན་ (svalakṣaṇa) — specifically characterised phenomenon
མཚན་ཉིད་ (Definiens): Everything that is ultimately existing, established from the side of the own mode of being of the object without being merely nominally existent
མཚོན་བྱེད་ (Illustration): [not given in source]
“Everything that is ultimately existing… established from the side of the own mode of being of the object without being merely nominally existent.”
For gyel-tsap, construction intervenes only when we artificially add something to the object, so commonsense objects and universals can be real (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 117).
Source: dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 117
Vasubandhu’s Two Levels
Before Dignāga, Vasubandhu distinguished two levels of svalakṣaṇa in the Abhidharmakośa (katsura-dignaga-lectures):
- dravya-svalakṣaṇa — svalakṣaṇa as a real entity (atoms themselves, beyond sense-cognition)
- āyatana-svalakṣaṇa — svalakṣaṇa as an objective support (colour-form, sound, fragrance, taste, the tangible)
Dignāga accepted both levels: sense-cognitions take āyatana-svalakṣaṇa as their objects, yet also take dravya-svalakṣaṇa insofar as they are produced from aggregates of atoms. He further accepted the Abhidharmic distinction between ultimate existence (paramārthasat/dharma) and conventional existence (saṃvṛtisat/prajñapti), following Abhidharmakośa VI.4: when something is destroyed, if its notion does not disappear it is ultimate; if it does, it is conventional (katsura-dignaga-lectures).
Dharmakīrti’s Account
See Dharmakīrti’s definition above for the formal tripartite definition. Key additional features of his account:
- Momentary (སྐད་ཅིག་མ་, kṣaṇika) — existing only for an instant
- Individual — not requiring conceptual synthesis
- The object of perception (not of thought or inference)
The Ge-luk Reinterpretation
See the definitions by Ge-dün-drup, Kay-drup, and Gyel-tsap above for the formal tripartite definitions. All three Ge-luk thinkers reflect a moderate realism that refuses to identify reality with strict individuality, allowing commonsense objects and universals to qualify as specifically characterised.
Sapan’s Controversial Claim
In the Treasury (TR 1.11), sakya-pandita makes the startling claim: གཞལ་བྱ་རང་མཚན་གཅིག་ཁོ་ན། — “Specifically characterised phenomena alone are the objects of cognition.” This provoked Bodong Panchen to call him a nihilist. Neither gyel-tsap nor gorampa reads this literally: Gyaltsab qualifies it with “ultimately,” while Gorampa introduces the distinction between objects of the mode of apprehension and objects of engagement, plus the concept of conventional valid cognition (ཀུན་ཏུ་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མ་) (sonam-introduction-treasury).
Sa-gya Account
The Sa-gya tradition follows Dharmakīrti more closely: specifically characterised phenomena are real individuals. Universals are entirely conceptual — generally-characterised. The identification of the real with the individual is maintained (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 116).
Significance
The disagreement over the scope of the specifically characterised is one of the fundamental fault lines between Ge-luk and Sa-gya. It determines:
- Whether universals can be real (the problem-of-universals)
- Whether commonsense objects are real or constructed
- Whether inference has genuine ontological support
Causal Efficacy as the Mark of the Real
Dharmakīrti’s crucial innovation over Diṅnāga: only svalakṣaṇa entities have causal efficacy (arthakriyāsamartha). This is stated directly in Pramāṇavārttika 3:3: “Whatever has causal powers, that really exists in this context. Anything else is declared to be just conventionally existent. These two are respectively particulars and objects in general” (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 231).
The possession of causal power and the ability to act on and influence other entities is therefore the distinguishing mark between the real and the unreal. An immediate consequence: objects in general, lacking unique spatio-temporal location, cannot be causally efficient, and are therefore not real (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 231).
The Bifurcation of Knowledge
Diṅnāga’s sharp division creates a curious consequence: perceived and inferred objects are radically distinct. When we infer fire from smoke and later perceive the fire, we do not achieve a second epistemic perspective on the same fire — the perceived fire (svalakṣaṇa) and the inferred fire (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) are different objects. Diṅnāga rejects pramāṇasamplava (mixing of epistemic instruments) (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 234–235).
Dharmakīrti’s Three Criteria: Gelug vs. Non-Gelug Readings
Dharmakīrti specified objective entities as those phenomena that are determinate (nges-pa) or unmixed (ma-‘dres-pa) in terms of:
- Spatial location (yul) — the western portion of an object does not exist in the east
- Temporal location (dus) — something that exists in the morning has a definite end in the evening
- Essential nature (ngo-bo) — something is distinguishable from other objects
Unmixed = not mixed up with or indistinguishable from something else.
Berzin notes that since these three criteria can apply both to nonstatic and static phenomena, they cannot be intended as a strict definition. Dharmakīrti used them only as criteria for refuting the Nyāya view of universals as indivisible entities inhering equally in all their instances (berzin-science-of-mind, Basic Distinctions among Cognitive Objects).
Gelug reading: “Being individual by essential nature” means something is distinguishable from other objects — this allows commonsense objects (which are distinguishable) to qualify as specifically characterised. Being “unmixed” means not being mixed up with or indistinguishable from something else. On this reading, commonsense objects and even kind syntheses can be objective entities.
Non-Gelug reading: “Being individual by essential nature” means the items do not require mental construction from the synthesis of other items. Being “unmixed” means not being mentally constructed from the synthesis of other items. On this reading, only moments of phenomena qualify: moments of sensibilia, of sounds, of ways of being aware, of noncongruent affecting variables. Commonsense objects — which do require mental synthesis — are excluded from objective entities (berzin-science-of-mind, Basic Distinctions among Cognitive Objects).
What Counts as Svalakṣaṇa: The Central Difference
The practical consequence of these divergent readings (berzin-science-of-mind, Basic Distinctions among Cognitive Objects):
| Gelug | Non-Gelug | |
|---|---|---|
| Commonsense objects | objective entities (rang-mtshan) | metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan) |
| Collection syntheses | objective entities | static metaphysical entities |
| Kind syntheses | objective entities | static metaphysical entities |
| Object categories | metaphysical entities | metaphysical entities |
| Moments of sensibilia | objective entities | objective entities |
| Commonsense sounds | objective entities | metaphysical entities (only moments of sounds are objective) |
Sources
- dreyfus-recognizing-reality — Chapters 2–5 (ontology), Chapters 6–10 (universals)
- westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti — causal efficacy as the mark of the real, PV 3:3, the bifurcation of knowledge (pp. 231–235)
- katsura-dignaga-lectures — Vasubandhu’s two levels of svalakṣaṇa (dravya vs. āyatana), Dignāga’s interpretation, Abhidharmic ultimate/conventional distinction
- sonam-introduction-treasury — Sapan’s claim that specifically characterised alone are objects of cognition (TR 1.11); Gorampa’s and Gyaltsab’s non-literal readings
- berzin-science-of-mind — Gelug vs. non-Gelug on Dharmakīrti’s three criteria; table of what counts as svalakṣaṇa in each tradition