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Dharmakīrti

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Dharmakīrti (ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པ་)

The most influential figure in Buddhist epistemology. His works became the reference point for all subsequent Buddhist logico-epistemological thought in India and Tibet.

Life

Dharmakīrti studied dignaga’s pramanasamuccaya with the latter’s disciple Īśvarasena, forming the lineage Vasubandhu → Diṅnāga → Īśvarasena → Dharmakīrti. Īśvarasena recognised that Dharmakīrti’s understanding surpassed his own and equalled Diṅnāga’s, encouraging him to compose the pramanavartika (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 218).

Dating

Frauwallner dates Dharmakīrti to 600–660 CE, based mainly on the fact that the Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang (mid-7th c.) did not mention him while Yijing (late 7th c.) did. Balcerowicz, drawing on Jaina sources, suggests 550–610 CE (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 218).

Legendary Debates

Traditional accounts describe Dharmakīrti infiltrating Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s household incognito as a servant in order to learn all his doctrines before later defeating him in debate. He is also said to have defeated Śaṅkara, who drowned himself in the Ganges — only to be reborn and defeated again, twice (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 219–220).

These biographies reveal the increasing importance of inter-doctrinal debate with non-Buddhists as the primary arena of philosophical activity, and the corresponding emphasis on epistemology and logic as tools for establishing common ground with opponents (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 220).

Dharmakīrti’s Own Assessment

Dharmakīrti’s opening and closing verses of the Pramāṇavārttika reflect on his work’s limited reception among non-Buddhist contemporaries: “Like the water of the sea, his work will remain in itself, without being absorbed by anybody” (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 249).

Philosophical Position

Dharmakīrti’s system is described doxographically as Sautrāntika following reasoning (རིགས་པའི་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་) in its primary orientation, with Yogācāra elements in certain passages. Tibetan thinkers recognise that this characterisation is somewhat awkward — it reflects the difficulty of pinning down his metaphysical commitments within the standard four-school doxography (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 20–21).

Ontology

Dharmakīrti holds a sharply antirealist ontology:

  • Reality consists exclusively of momentary (སྐད་ཅིག་མ་, kṣaṇika), causally effective individual thing-events
  • The real is defined as the specifically-characterised (རང་མཚན་, svalakṣaṇa) — that which has definite spatio-temporal location and individual essence
  • All universals, commonsense enduring objects, and abstract entities are conceptual constructs — generally-characterised (སྤྱི་མཚན་, sāmānyalakṣaṇa)
  • This creates a fundamental tension: his system needs universals to ground inference, yet his ontology excludes them from reality

Epistemology

  • valid-cognition (ཚད་མ་, pramāṇa) is defined as nondeceptive cognition (མི་བསླུ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་, avisaṃvādi-jñāna)
  • Two types: perception (མངོན་སུམ་, pratyakṣa) and inference (རྗེས་དཔག་, anumāna)
  • Nondeceptiveness involves both a practical dimension (readiness to perform a function) and a normative/intentional dimension (revealing a hitherto unknown object)
  • The novelty requirement excludes memory from being valid cognition

Philosophy of Language

  • Developed dignaga’s apoha theory: words and concepts function by exclusion (སེལ་བ་), not by picking out positive properties
  • Concepts are fundamentally mistaken — they superimpose a false unity on reality’s discrete particulars — yet they can be pragmatically valid

Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition

Dharmakīrti is credited with seven treatises (ཚད་མ་སྡེ་བདུན་), of which the pramanavartika (Commentary on Valid Cognition) became the primary text in Tibet thanks to sakya-pandita’s influence.

Sliding Scales of Analysis

Westerhoff attributes to Dharmakīrti four levels of philosophical analysis in ascending order of sophistication (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 253–254):

  1. Ordinary beings — pragmatically successful but philosophically flawed (satkāyadṛṣṭi)
  2. Abhidharma reductionism — persons and partite objects are mere verbal designations on conglomerations of dharmas
  3. Particularism (Sautrāntika) — spatial, temporal, and conceptual extension are all cognitive errors; reality consists only of utterly distinct momentary particulars
  4. Idealism (Yogācāra) — the duality of perceiving subject and perceived object is illusory; all phenomena are mental

Dharmakīrti argues mainly from level 3, which he knows to be false — it serves as the lowest common denominator offering the best balance of conceptual sophistication and broad acceptance for inter-doctrinal debate (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 255). Only one chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika (Ch.3) consistently adopts the idealist perspective.

Mipham quotes Dharmakīrti: “When I investigate outer phenomena, I take the Sautrantika as my starting point” (shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara-intro, p. 27). But reasoning demonstrates that philosophical consistency demands idealism: the difficulties of the aspect theory (sākāravāda) forced Dharmakīrti to shift from a Sautrāntika to a Yogācāra framework. This logically induced progression mirrors the historical development from Bhāviveka’s Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka to shantarakshita’s Yogācāra-Madhyamaka (shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara-intro, pp. 26–27).

Crucially, the causal relation is itself unreal by Dharmakīrti’s own particularist criteria — relations, like object-types, are subject to the neither-one-nor-many argument (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 257). This paradox (the mark of the real is itself unreal) is resolved by the sliding-scales framework: the particularist position need not be defended against every charge of inconsistency.

Scriptural Authority

Dharmakīrti subsumes scripture under inference — no need to posit testimony (śabda) as a third epistemic instrument. He proves the Buddha’s authority by unpacking Diṅnāga’s opening verse of the Pramāṇasamuccaya: compassion → practice → teaching → embodiment of epistemic instruments. “Compassion is the proof” (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 240).

Yet Dharmakīrti is deeply sceptical about scriptural inference: we cannot know that the Buddha truly has the qualities making him authoritative, since mental states are supersensible. Scriptural authority is a practical necessity (agatyā) for those who wish to follow the Buddhist path — a rationally defensible, fallible choice, not an objective epistemic instrument (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 242–244).

Yogic Perception

For Dharmakīrti, yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) is not an epistemic super-power but a three-stage process: intensity (prakarṣa), termination (paryanta), and yogic perception proper. It is directed at concepts, not at momentary particulars. Dharmakīrti compares its vividness to that of dreams and fantasies — it is validated not by revealing ultimate reality but by its soteriological goal (bringing about liberation). It therefore cannot stand alone but must be combined with scriptural authority (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 247–250).

Indian Commentarial Traditions

Following Stcherbatsky (as modified by later scholars), four schools of Indian commentary:

  1. Literal exegesis: Devendrabuddhi (630–690 CE), Śākyabuddhi
  2. Religious school: Prajñākaragupta (740–800 CE)
  3. Philosophical school: dharmottara (750–810 CE), Śaṅkarananda
  4. Mādhyamika interpretation: Śāntarakṣita (725–783 CE), Kamalaśīla (740–795 CE)

Tibetan Reception

Dharmakīrti’s influence on Tibetan philosophy is immense. His vocabulary (valid cognition, elimination, specifically/generally characterised) pervades all Tibetan philosophical discourse, including Madhyamaka discussions. The debate format still practised in Tibetan monasteries is based largely on his logic.

Two rival interpretive traditions emerged:

Sources

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