Apoha — Exclusion (སེལ་བ་, apoha)
The hallmark of Buddhist philosophy of language. The apoha theory, originated by dignaga and developed by dharmakirti, holds that words and concepts function not by picking out positive properties in the world but by excluding what the referent is not.
Definitions
Dignāga (Pramāṇasamuccaya)
མཚན་གཞི་ (Definiendum): སེལ་བ་ / གཞན་སེལ་ (apoha / anyāpoha) — exclusion / elimination of other
མཚན་ཉིད་ (Definiens): The negative construction by which a concept or word signifies its object through the elimination of what it is not (གཞན་སེལ་) — the meaning of a word is not a positive entity but the preclusion of discordant kinds
མཚོན་བྱེད་ (Illustration): “Cow” functions by excluding everything that is not a cow; “cowness” is not a real property shared by all cows but merely the exclusion of all cows from the class non-cow
“Knowledge based on verbal communication signifies its object through the elimination of other things, just as [the fact of] being produced [signifies impermanence].”
Source: pramanasamuccaya, V; dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 225
Dharmakīrti (Pramāṇavārttika)
མཚན་གཞི་ (Definiendum): སེལ་བ་ (apoha) — exclusion
མཚན་ཉིད་ (Definiens): The conceptual construction that determines objects through a double negation: first, a simple negation (མེད་དགག་, prasajya-pratiṣedha) that excludes non-X; second, a bound negation (མ་ཡིན་དགག་, paryudāsa-pratiṣedha) that affirms the appearance of X
མཚོན་བྱེད་ (Illustration): Antipyretic drugs — their “causal power” is relativised to human desires; the concept “antipyretic” groups diverse substances by excluding what does not reduce fever
Dharmakīrti’s key innovation is that the causal power underlying exclusion is relativised to human desires and purposes. The concept “antipyretic drug” groups radically different substances (sandalwood, camphor, etc.) not because they share a real property but because they all satisfy a human need — reducing fever. The exclusion is constructed relative to a practical interest (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 225; westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 240–242).
Source: pramanavartika; dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 225
The Core Idea
When we say “cow,” we do not grasp a real universal “cowness” (as the Nyāya would hold). Instead, the concept “cow” works by excluding everything that is not a cow. The meaning of the word is not a positive entity but a negative determination — the elimination of what is other (གཞན་སེལ་, anyāpoha).
This resolves a fundamental tension in Buddhist ontology: if only individuals are real and universals are fictions, how can language and thought function? The apoha theory answers: they function through exclusion, not through grasping real universals.
The Mechanism: Two Kinds of Negation
The apoha construction is not simply double negation. It employs two different kinds of negation that do not cancel each other out (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 236–237):
- First, form the non-implicative negation (prasajya-pratiṣedha) of “being blue” → the set of non-blue things, without assuming this set is unified by any object-type
- Then, form the implicative negation (paryudāsa-pratiṣedha) of that result → returns us to the set of blue things, but the passage through non-implicative negation has stripped away the metaphysical assumption that all blue objects share a real property of blueness
This is supported by the general Buddhist intuition that absences are less real than presences — an empty table is both the absence of an orange and the absence of an apple, and the identity of each absence depends on our (mind-made) expectations (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 236).
Dharmakīrti’s Innovation: Causal Power and Human Desires
Dharmakīrti introduced the notion of causal power relativised to human desires to explain the original grouping that the apoha machinery operates on. All particulars are unique and without resemblance to any other, yet certain particulars all fulfil some of our desires. Every fire-particular is distinct, but all fires fulfil the desire for warmth, allowing us to group them under the concept “fire” (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 237).
The example of antipyretic drugs is key: these all answer to the human need for a fever-reducing medicine, but they do so through causally different mechanisms. This shows there need be no common underlying property — only a common satisfaction of a human need (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, p. 238).
Evolution of the Theory
The apoha theory evolved significantly across its history:
- dignaga: original formulation in the Pramāṇasamuccaya Chapter 5. Katsura notes that Dignāga’s apoha theory presupposes a Vaiśeṣika-like hierarchy of categorical concepts — Substance (dravya), Quality (guṇa), Action (karman), and Universal (sāmānya) — commonly accepted by people (lokaprasiddhi) (katsura-dignaga-lectures)
- dharmakirti: developed the theory by connecting concept formation to the negative nature of conceptuality — concepts are fundamentally mistaken (they superimpose a false unity) but pragmatically valid. Introduced causal power relativised to human desires (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 237–238)
- shantarakshita (725–783): transformed the theory by introducing the notion of representations (ākāra); part of his synthesis uniting Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and the pramāṇa tradition (shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara-intro, p. 3)
- sakya-pandita (1182–1251): in Ch.4 of the Treasury, vehemently attacked the earlier Tibetan tenet that perception determines its objects (རང་ཡུལ་ངེས་པ་), since this implies acceptance of real universals. Perception merely holds its object in the perceptual field; conceptual thought then determines it. Also analysed the structure of abstraction and conceptual coalescence (sonam-introduction-treasury)
- gorampa (1429–1489): defined exclusion as “a superimposition which appears as this object through the elimination of its direct opposites” (sonam-introduction-treasury)
- Tibetan interpreters more broadly: Sa-gya thinkers maintained the antirealist reading; Ge-luk thinkers reinterpreted apoha within their moderate realism
Dreyfus’s Discussion
Dreyfus devotes Part III of Book One (Chapters 11–15) to the apoha theory, covering:
- The history and Hindu critiques of apoha (Chapter 11)
- Dharmakīrti’s account of concept formation (Chapter 12)
- The concept of negation (Chapter 13)
- Object universal (དོན་སྤྱི་, don spyi) in Ge-luk and Sa-gya (Chapter 14)
- Philosophy of language: signifier and signified (Chapter 15)
Three Types of Exclusion (Gelug Analysis)
The Gelug tradition (following Berzin’s systematisation) distinguishes three types of exclusions of something else (གཞན་སེལ་, gzhan-sel) as negation phenomena (berzin-science-of-mind, Distinctions in Terms of Ways of Cognizing):
1. Individually Characterised Object Exclusions (don rang-mtshan-gi gzhan-sel)
- Nonstatic objective entities — e.g., “not an orange” and “nothing other than an apple”
- Can be implicitly apprehended when explicitly apprehending an objective entity such as “apple,” either non-conceptually or conceptually
- On the Gelug reading, these are nonstatic because they share the same essential nature as the commonsense object of which they are a quality
2. Mental Exclusions of Something Else (blo’i gzhan-sel)
- Equivalent to conceptual categories — the static metaphysical entities that are the appearing objects of conceptual-cognition
- E.g., the meaning/object category “apples”
- Can be implicitly apprehended only in conceptual cognition, and only by the self-awareness (rang-rig) that is part of and accompanies the conceptual cognition — not by the mental consciousness of the conceptual cognition itself
3. Absences (med-pa)
- E.g., the absence of a peel on a peeled apple; space (nam-mkha’) — the absence of anything tangible that would obstruct motion
- Can be implicitly apprehended in either non-conceptual or conceptual cognition, but only by the reflexive awareness of a conceptual cognition
Non-Gelug contrast: All three types — object exclusions, mental exclusions, and absences — are static metaphysical entities in the non-Gelug reading. There are no nonstatic object exclusions.
The Isolator in Conceptual Cognition
The apoha mechanism operates in conceptual-cognition through an isolator (ldog-pa, specifier): a conceptual device of the type “nothing other than X” (ma-yin-pa-las log-pa). The isolator:
- Is an implicative negation phenomenon (ma-yin dgag)
- Excludes “everything other than X”
- In the wake of this exclusion, explicitly tosses a mental appearance of X (a generic appearance pervading all members of the category)
- Implicitly tosses X as an objective external entity
This structure shows how apoha generates positive cognitive content (a representation of X) through a negative mechanism (excluding non-X), without requiring a real positive universal “X-ness.”
Sources
- dreyfus-recognizing-reality — Chapters 11–15
- westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti — two-negation mechanism, causal power and human desires, contrast with Mīmāṃsā language realism (pp. 235–238)
- katsura-dignaga-lectures — Dignāga’s presupposition of a Vaiśeṣika-like categorical hierarchy for apoha
- sonam-introduction-treasury — Sapan’s attack on perception determining its objects; Gorampa’s definition of exclusion; the distinction between theoretical and practical standpoints
- berzin-science-of-mind — three types of exclusion phenomena; isolator mechanism in conceptual cognition; Gelug vs. non-Gelug on the ontological status of object exclusions