The Adornment of the Middle Way — Translators’ Introduction

The introduction to the Padmakara Translation Group’s translation of Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṅkāra with Mipham’s commentary (Shambhala, 2005), 30 pages.

Overview

A rich contextual essay situating Śāntarakṣita’s synthesis within the history of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka. Covers the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, the role of Yogācāra/Cittamātra in Śāntarakṣita’s system, and — most relevant for this wiki — the relationship between the logico-epistemological tradition (pramāṇa) and Madhyamaka. Also discusses Mipham’s commentary in the context of the 19th-century Rimé movement, and Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Madhyamaka.

Key Themes

1. Śāntarakṣita’s Synthesis (pp. 1–4)

• Śāntarakṣita effected “the last great development of Buddhist philosophy in India” by uniting: (1) Madhyamaka (ultimate truth), (2) Cittamātra/Yogācāra (conventional truth), and (3) the logico-epistemological tradition of dignaga and dharmakirti (p. 3)
• He was abbot of Nālandā, a “formidable expert in the art of philosophical disputation” (p. 2)
• He established the first Buddhist institutions in Tibet: built Samye, ordained the first monks, inaugurated the translation enterprise, and invited Padmasambhava (p. 2)
• Mipham presents Śāntarakṣita as “the third charioteer” — the equal of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga — whose Madhyamakālaṅkāra united the two great streams of Mahāyāna (p. 4)

2. The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction (pp. 4–15)

• Before the 12th century, Tibetan Madhyamaka was dominated by Śāntarakṣita’s tradition. Candrakīrti’s major works were only translated by Patsab Nyima Drak (1055–1145)
• Two Svātantrika subschools: Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka (Bhāviveka) and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka (Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla)
• Bhāviveka’s use of formal logic in commentary was closely connected with Dignāga’s “important and still recent work” (p. 7)
• Candrakīrti’s critique rejected the logico-epistemological tradition of Dignāga as a “misguided attempt to find philosophical completeness” antithetical to Madhyamaka insight (p. 10)
• Tsongkhapa’s paradoxical move: rejected Svātantrika in favour of Prāsaṅgika but adopted the pramāṇa teachings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti according to cha-ba’s interpretation — applying the logical method to a view that had traditionally rejected it (p. 16)
• Mipham’s synthesis: Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika differ in method, not in ultimate view; both are necessary. Svātantrika emphasises the “approximate ultimate” (རྣམ་གྲངས་པའི་དོན་དམ་), Prāsaṅgika the ultimate in itself (p. 14)

3. Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka (pp. 25–30)

• The logico-epistemological tradition was “primarily and intimately linked” with Svātantrika Madhyamaka from its inception (p. 10)
• Dharmakirti’s strategy of “ascending scales of analysis”: begins with Sautrāntika as a point of departure for debate with Hindu opponents, but reasoning demonstrates that philosophical consistency demands idealism. Mipham quotes: “When I investigate outer phenomena, I take the Sautrantika as my starting point” (p. 27)
• The difficulties of the aspect theory (sākāravāda) forced Dharmakīrti to shift to a Yogācāra framework — mirroring the historical development from Bhāviveka’s Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka to Śāntarakṣita’s Yogācāra-Madhyamaka (pp. 26–27)
• Śāntarakṣita’s acceptance of Mind Only on the conventional level is “in agreement with the view of the glorious Dharmakirti” and constitutes an epistemological (not ontological) account (p. 27)

4. Universals and Apoha (pp. 27–29)

• Elementary exposition of Dharmakīrti’s rejection of universals and apoha theory
• Two rival traditions of Dharmakīrti interpretation in Tibet: cha-ba’s “earlier tradition” (moderate realist, inherited by Ge-luk) and sakya-pandita’s “later tradition” (antirealist, upheld by Sa-gya and other non-Ge-luk schools) (pp. 29–30)
• A “minority Buddhist interpretation” in India had already attenuated Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s antirealism in the direction of moderate realism; Cha-ba encountered and adopted this by “what may have been no more than a historical accident” (p. 29)
• Sakya Paṇḍita “in his celebrated masterpiece the ཚད་མ་རིགས་གཏེར་, strongly reaffirmed Dharmakirti’s antirealism” — sustained by gorampa and sakya-chok-den, and accepted as normative by non-Ge-luk traditions (pp. 29–30)
• Mipham prefers the antirealist interpretation of Sakya Paṇḍita (p. 30)

5. The Argument of Neither One nor Many (pp. 30)

• The Madhyamakālaṅkāra invokes this argument more intensively (62 of 97 stanzas) than any other Buddhist text
• One of several standard arguments for the emptiness of phenomena

6. Atiśa on Pramāṇa (p. 30)

• Atiśa refused to teach logic and epistemology in Tibet, saying the doctrines of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti had been elaborated to defend Buddhism against Hindu opponents and were successful in India but had “little purpose” in Tibet
• This sits alongside Candrakīrti’s distrust of pramāṇa as relevant to establishing the view

Relevance to the Three Primary Texts

• pramanasamuccaya: Dignāga’s work cited as the foundation of the logico-epistemological tradition closely linked with Svātantrika Madhyamaka
• pramanavartika: Dharmakīrti’s strategy of ascending scales discussed; his shift from Sautrāntika to Yogācāra framework mirrors Śāntarakṣita’s synthesis
• pramanayuktanidhi: Directly mentioned as Sakya Paṇḍita’s “celebrated masterpiece” reaffirming Dharmakīrti’s antirealism against Cha-ba’s realist interpretation (p. 29)

Translation Material

No verse translations from the three primary texts.

Sources

• dreyfus-recognizing-reality — covers the Sa-gya/Ge-luk debate on universals from a different angle
• westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti — covers the sliding-scales model and Dharmakīrti’s philosophical classification