Gorampa Sonam Sengge

Gorampa Sonam Sengge (གོ་རམ་པ་བསོད་ནམས་སེང་གེ་)

Disciple of Rong-dön, and one of the thinkers most responsible for fixing what separates Sakya from Gelug. Modern Sakya scholars treat him as the foremost of sakya-pandita’s commentators.

Life

• Active in the political conflicts between Tsang and central Tibet, supporting the Ring-pung family; his contemporaries attached great political significance to his movements between the two
• Died before the age of sixty, a considerable shock to his tradition, and some took it for a consequence of his involvement in the escalating warfare between Tsang and central Tibet (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 27)
• His works were suppressed following the ideological proscriptions at the beginning of the 17th century after the rise to power of the Gelug school; reassembled with difficulty at the beginning of the 20th century (shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara-intro, p. 12)

Contributions to Pramāṇa

Gorampa defends sakya-pandita’s antirealism in detail and attacks the Gelug reinterpretation of it, gyel-tsap and kay-drup in particular. His commentary on the Treasure is the standard Sakya reading.

Dreyfus reports that the Sakya scholars he spoke to hold Gorampa’s words to reflect “accurately and precisely” Sakya Paṇḍita’s ideas, and then declines to endorse that: “the reality is probably slightly different”, though on many issues Gorampa’s claim to be the orthodox interpreter “is not far from the truth, at least in the domain of logic and epistemology” (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 27). The gap between the two formulations is where most of the interesting questions about this page’s subject sit.

Philosophical Positions

• Strong antirealism: universals and individuations are entirely conceptual
• Representationalism regarding perception: external objects are not directly perceived but apprehended through their representations (Chs 25–26 of dreyfus-recognizing-reality)
• Careful definitions of key terms following Sakya Paṇḍita’s system
• Critical of Gelug innovations that depart from Dharmakīrti’s original intent

Technical Contributions

• Developed, with sakya-chok-den, a fourfold typology of objects: appearing objects (སྣང་ཡུལ་), held objects (གཟུང་ཡུལ་), conceived objects (ཞེན་ཡུལ་), objects of engagement (འཇུག་ཡུལ་). Sönam is explicit that Sapan himself did not develop this (sonam-introduction-treasury, Chapter One: Objects of Comprehension)
• Defined universals as “a commonly appearing entity which is superimposed”, divided into kind universals (རིགས་སྤྱི་), meaning universals (དོན་སྤྱི་) and collection universals (ཚོགས་སྤྱི་); wholes and durations are non-entities along with universals (sonam-introduction-treasury, Chapter Three: Universals and Particulars)
• Defined exclusion (apoha) as “a superimposition which appears as this object through the elimination of its direct opposites” (sonam-introduction-treasury, Chapter Four: Appearance and Elimination)
• Conventional valid cognition (ཀུན་ཏུ་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མ་) is his device for saving TR 1.11. Sapan’s claim that specifically characterised phenomena alone are objects of cognition is read as describing the objects of this type of cognition, which takes them as its object because this type alone answers practical needs; the reading pairs with his distinction between objects of the mode of apprehension and objects of engagement (sonam-introduction-treasury, Chapter One: Objects of Comprehension)
• Accepts four valid cognitions, analogy and scriptural authority included, in his reading of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, which sits oddly beside the two-pramāṇa scheme he defends in epistemology (sonam-introduction-treasury, Chapter One: Objects of Comprehension)

Representationalism and the “hidden” external object

Gorampa’s perception is representationalist: what perception directly bears on is the representation of the object, not the object. The external thing casts an aspect (རྣམ་པ་) resembling itself on consciousness, and the resemblance is what makes the Sautrāntika account work, since it is what secures that perception is of this object and not another (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 404–405, 418–419).

Objects are accordingly “hidden” (ལྐོག་ན་མོ་). Dreyfus is careful about how weak the term is here, because Gorampa’s sense is not the ordinary one. Being hidden does not mean being wrapped away behind the aspect, as kay-drup puts the position when attacking it, and it is not the hiddenness of universals, which is hiddenness in the usual sense. It refers only to the object’s existing before it is perceived, and hence to perception’s reaching it through a representation. Since the object casts an aspect similar to itself, it is in that sense revealed to consciousness rather than concealed from it (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 418–419). Dreyfus reports that sakya-chok-den reads Gorampa’s “hidden” in the strong sense, and takes this to be a misreading.

Dreyfus’s verdict on all this is in his heading: An Unstable Compromise. Gorampa wants the causal theory and its consequence that object and perception cannot coexist, and he also wants perception to reach the object rather than stop at its image; “hidden” is the word doing the work of holding both, and it is asked to mean less and less as the argument proceeds.

A related point often run together with this one should be kept apart. The argument that the Gelug equation of held and appearing objects is incoherent within a causal theory is sakya-chok-den’s, not Gorampa’s: if the held object causes the perception it must have ceased when the perception arises and so cannot appear to it (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 385–386). Gorampa is not on Sakya Chok-den’s side of the surrounding dispute either. Against Sakya Chok-den’s claim that appearing and conceived objects are Tibetan inventions, Gorampa looks for Indian sources; Dreyfus finds his sources unconvincing, and then finds Sakya Chok-den wrong too, since dharmottara plainly asserts a conceived object (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 385–386).

Sakya apoha closer to Dignāga than Dharmakīrti

Gorampa distinguishes the conceived signified (zhen pa’i brjod bya), the real external object, from the direct signified (dngos kyi brjod bya), the object universal. Dreyfus’s claim is that Sakya thinkers who work with this pair end up, “probably unbeknownst to them”, closer to Dignāga than to Dharmakīrti: like Dignāga they make language primarily a matter internal to the conceptual realm, an articulation between a communicative form and a signified concept, with sounds as the externalisation of what is conceived internally. Dharmakīrti’s own view is that language consists of vocal indications of what is in the speaker’s mind, and Sakya readers tend to pay less attention to his insistence on the objective basis of concepts and on intention (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 273–274).

Dreyfus attributes this to Gorampa’s school rather than to Gorampa alone; the page above states it of Gorampa because Gorampa supplies the analysis Dreyfus works from, but the wider claim is about Sa-gya thinkers generally.

Key Works

• Clarification of the Seven Treatises (སྡེ་བདུན་གསལ་བྱེད་)—principal commentary on Dharmakīrti’s system
• Explanation of the Treasury (ཚད་མ་རིགས་གཏེར་གྱི་རྣམ་བཤད་)—commentary on the Treasury
• Light of Samantabhadra (ཀུན་བཟང་འོད་ཟེར་, Kun-bzang ‘od-zer)—running stanza-by-stanza commentary on pramanavartika; composed 1474; chapters 1–2 translated by Gavin Kilty (Wisdom, 2022) as gorampa-pramanavartika
• Sun of Samantabhadra (ཀུན་བཟང་ཉི་མ་)—shorter PV commentary
• General Exposition of Middle Way Philosophy (དབུ་མའི་སྤྱི་དོན་)

Interpretive Positions on the Pramāṇavārttika (Ch. 1)

From the Light of Samantabhadra (gorampa-pramanavartika):

• Chapter 1 is placed first because “separating what is meaningful from what is without meaning” (the project of Chapter 2—establishing the Buddha as a valid being) depends on the reasoning developed in Chapter 1. Rejects Devendrabuddhi’s and Prajñākaragupta’s accounts of the chapter order
• The reason and predicate in a same-nature inference (e.g. product / impermanence) are one entity but distinct isolates—isolates are conceptual, not ontological; commentators who reify the “one nature, separate isolates” relation “have not understood the intent of the text”
• Verbal expressions and conceptual cognition always engage by exclusion, never by affirmation; direct perception alone engages by affirmation, and does so without conceptually distinguishing features
• Universals, wholes, and durations are all non-entities; the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika real universal cannot abide either by dependence on its particulars or by being illustrated by them
• Close engagement with the Indian commentaries (Śākyabuddhi, Yamāri, Prajñākaragupta, Śaṃkarānanda, Devendrabuddhi); frequent correction of previous Tibetan commentators

Interpretive Positions on the Pramāṇavārttika (Ch. 2)

From the Light of Samantabhadra (gorampa-pramanavartika):

• Three-feature reading of “nondeceptive”: nondeceptiveness has distinct aspects of object, agent, and action—“the exclusive Sakya way of explaining nondeceptive” (on PV 2.1)
• Single definition: “nondeceptive consciousness” and “revealing unknown phenomena” are synonymous formulations of one definition of valid-cognition, against Devendrabuddhi (two separate definitions) and the Ornament commentaries of Prajñākaragupta and Yamāri (separate definition and definiendum)
• Wholly designated valid cognition vs. innate characteristic: the “consciousness” aspect of pramāṇa is an innate characteristic ascertained by self-awareness (Gorampa: “self-knowing”, རང་རིག་); nondeceptiveness is determined by a subsequent ascertaining cognition (Gorampa: “subsequent ascertaining consciousness”, ངེས་ཤེས་) as a cognitive designation. The scheme of ascertainment-from-self and ascertainment-from-others (PV 2.4d–5a) operates exclusively at the level of wholly designated valid cognitions. Gorampa credits the reading to “the unique commentarial tradition of Jamyang Sakya Paṇḍita” (Jamyang, འཇམ་དབྱངས་, being an epithet of sakya-pandita), and says “most Tibetans” fail to distinguish the two levels
• Nature of mind is luminous (PV 2.208–209): the defilements had no power to harm mind by way of its nature even previously (before no-self was seen), not merely after. The reading “previously = as soon as no-self was seen” misses the force of the verse
• Conventional self, ultimate aggregates in saṃsāra and liberation (on PV 2.191–192): for Sautrāntika-upward (excluding the Sāṃmitīya), bondage and liberation apply ultimately to the aggregates and only conventionally to the designated self; for Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka designation is symmetric between person and aggregate. “These points are essential for the philosophical system of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka combined”
• Sustained corrective polemic against “past scholars” and “most Tibetans” on: forward/reverse division of the homage, assignment of rebirth-proof verses between and , and the structure of the liberation argument (which they present as a loose list of refutations rather than as two linked antidote demonstrations)

Sources

• dreyfus-recognizing-reality—Introduction II on his life and standing, ch. 25 on apperception and representationalism, ch. 26 on whether external objects are perceptible, ch. 15 on the signifier/signified pair
• shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara-intro—suppression and reassembly of his works (p. 12)
• sonam-introduction-treasury—fourfold typology of objects, definitions of universals and exclusion, conventional valid cognition, key works listed
• gorampa-pramanavartika—Light of Samantabhadra, running commentary on PV Chs. 1–2 (Inference for Oneself; Pramāṇasiddhi, Establishment of Valid Cognition)