Non-Valid Cognition (ཚད་མིན་)
The complement of valid-cognition: cognitions that fail to non-deceptively realise their own object. The classification of non-valid cognitions is the principal subject-matter of Treasury Ch. 2 (བློ་བརྟག་པ་, sakya-pandita) and of gorampa’s commentary; it is also the locus of the most explicit Sa-gya / early-Tibetan polemic in the pramāṇa tradition.
Definition (Sa-gya system)
མཚན་གཞི་ (Definiendum): ཚད་མིན་ — non-valid cognition
མཚན་ཉིད་ (Definiens): མི་བསླུ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ — a cognition that is not non-deceiving (i.e. that is deceptive)
མཚོན་བྱེད་ (Illustration): the cognition grasping sound as permanent (སྒྲ་རྟག་འཛིན་བློ་)
The illustration is glossed: this cognition is non-valid because it is deceived (བསླུ་བ་) with regard to its own object — “permanent sound” — since it fails to realise that object (which, being non-existent, cannot be realised at all).
Source: dzongsar-class-cognition
The Sa-gya Threefold Division
When divided, non-valid cognition has three exclusive and exhaustive types:
- Non-realising cognition (མ་རྟོགས་པ་)
- Wrong conceptuality (ལོག་རྟོག་)
- Doubt (ཐེ་ཚོམ་)
This is the position of sakya-pandita in the Treasury, expanded by gorampa and presented in the class slides. It replaces the earlier-Tibetan five-type list of Cha-pa and Tsur-tön (see §Refutation below).
1. Non-realising cognition (མ་རྟོགས་པ་)
Definition: A cognition empty of having realised its own object as either “that” or “not-that” (རང་ཡུལ་དེ་དང་དེ་མིན་གང་རུང་དུ་རྟོགས་པས་སྟོང་པའི་ཤེས་པ་).
Paradigm example: the subsequent-cognition ascertaining a vase. It does not freshly realise the vase (lacks “realising as that”) and also does not misapprehend it (lacks “realising as not-that”) — hence empty of both.
Three sub-types of non-realising cognition
A. Not having engaged the object (མ་ཞུགས་)
The cognition simply has not started to operate on its object. Example: the cognition “apprehending the three modes (ཚུལ་གསུམ་) of a logical sign” in someone unfamiliar with logic. The three modes are the conceived object (ཞེན་ཡུལ་) — so it is not as if no object is held — but the cognition cannot engage with what the three modes actually mean. It is deluded (རྨོངས་པ་) with respect to them.
B. Engaged but seeking incomplete (ཚོལ་བའི་བྱ་བ་མ་རྫོགས་)
The cognition is investigating but has not arrived. Example: the cognition that investigates “Is sound permanent or impermanent?” — not deluded, not one-sidedly committed. The slides note this looks suspiciously like equally-balanced doubt and may in fact reduce to it.
C. Seeking complete but unfound (རྫོགས་ཀྱང་མ་རྙེད་)
Three further sub-types:
- (i) Object-to-be-realised absent — paradigmatic subsequent-cognition: the prior valid cognition already exhausted what was there to be realised, so this cognition merely “adds on” (བསྣན་ནས་) to it. The vase is still its conceived object.
- (ii) Realising cognition corrupted (རྟོགས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་བློ་བསླད་) — e.g. the conceptual cognition that grasps sound as permanent in the mind-stream of someone corrupted by a bad tenet system or by permanence-grasping itself. The slides flag a subtlety: the literal reading over-extends (every cognition in such a person’s mind-stream would qualify); the intended scope is the specific permanence-grasping cognition. The slides further suspect this case in fact reduces to latent doubt or wrong cognition.
- (iii) Object not even an object of knowledge — proposed example: a karmically-fortuned perception of a piśāca (ཤ་ཟ་). The piśāca is present but lies outside the standard range of valid cognition for an ordinary perceiver. The slides flag this example as doctrinally puzzling.
2. Wrong conceptuality (ལོག་རྟོག་)
Definition: A cognition such that, although it apprehends its own object one-sidedly — either through clear appearance or through reliance on a contradictory sign (འགལ་རྟགས་) — its object is invalidated by [a cognition apprehending] “not-that” (རང་ཡུལ་ལ་དེ་མིན་གྱིས་གནོད་པ་).
Paradigm example: the cognition that, relying on the sign “being produced,” apprehends sound one-sidedly as permanent. It is invalidated by the inferential valid cognition realising sound to be impermanent.
Two-fold division
A. Conceptual wrong cognition (རྟོག་པ་ལོག་ཤེས་) — three sub-types
- Mistaken in aspect (རྣམ་པ་): apprehending a multicoloured rope as a snake. Underlying contradictory sign: “the multicoloured rope is a snake, because it is a multicoloured object of visual cognition.”
- Mistaken in time (དུས་): apprehending a present blue object as a past blue. Underlying contradictory sign: “the present blue is a past blue, because it appears now.”
- Mistaken in object (ཡུལ་): apprehending śapa and shukpa as one kind. Underlying contradictory sign: “śapa is shukpa, because the śapa’s branches have leaves.”
B. Non-conceptual wrong cognition (རྟོག་མེད་ལོག་ཤེས་) — two sub-types
- Mistaken sense-cognition (དབང་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་བ་): the sense-cognition in which two moons appear; invalidated by the valid cognition seeing one moon.
- Mistaken mental cognition (ཡིད་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་བ་): the dream-cognition apprehending oneself as having obtained 100,000 silver coins; invalidated by the waking cognition realising one has not.
The objects of non-conceptual wrong cognition are necessarily non-existent. The objects of conceptual wrong cognition are not necessarily non-existent — e.g. the meaning-universal of “permanent sound” exists (as a mental image) even though “permanent sound” itself does not.
3. Doubt (ཐེ་ཚོམ་)
Definition: A conceptual cognition such that, although it apprehends its object as “that,” its functional capacity to apprehend “that” being undiminished, it is also capable of apprehending “not-that” (དེར་འཛིན་ཡང་དེར་འཛིན་པའི་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཉམས་པ་དེ་མིན་དུ་འཛིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་རྟོག་པ་).
Paradigm example: the cognition that apprehends sound as permanent on the basis of the sign “being an object of valid cognition” (གཞལ་བྱ་).
Two-fold division
A. Manifest doubt (ཐེ་ཚོམ་མངོན་འགྱུར་)
- Equally-balanced (ཆ་མཉམ་པ་): “Is sound permanent or impermanent?” — apprehending the two alternatives in equal measure.
- Apprehending one side more strongly (ཤས་ཆེར་): further divided into:
- Fact-conforming doubt (དོན་འགྱུར་): “…most likely impermanent” — leans toward the actual mode of being.
- Fact-non-conforming doubt (དོན་མི་འགྱུར་): “…most likely permanent” — leans away from the actual mode of being.
B. Latent doubt (བག་ལ་ཉལ་)
A cognition either relying on an inconclusive sign (མ་ངེས་པའི་རྟགས་) or grasping a mere thesis without depending on a sign (རྟགས་ལ་མ་ལྟོས་པའི་དམ་བཅའ་ཙམ་). The Sa-gya assimilates the early Tibetans’ “mental cogitation” (ཡིད་དཔྱོད་) to this category — see refutation below.
Refutation of the Early-Tibetan Five-Type List
Cha-pa, Tsur-tön, and others held five categories of non-valid cognition. The Sa-gya system collapses them to the three above:
| Early-Tibetan category | Sa-gya verdict |
|---|---|
| Mental cogitation (ཡིད་དཔྱོད་) | Refuted from the root — reduces to doubt, wrong cognition, or inference. |
| Appearing-but-not-ascertained (སྣང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པ་) | Pervasion that it is non-valid is refuted (would entail no perception is valid). |
| Subsequent cognition (བཅད་ཤེས་) | Accepted as non-valid — but no “direct subsequent cognition” admitted. |
| Wrong cognition (ལོག་ཤེས་) | Retained as ལོག་རྟོག་. |
| Doubt (ཐེ་ཚོམ་) | Retained. |
The mental-cogitation dilemma
Does ཡིད་དཔྱོད་ depend on a logical sign?
- Not at all: then it grasps a mere thesis — by definition, latent doubt. The Pramāṇaviniścaya says: “Because, by [its] nature of being unable to view the object, it is a cause of doubt”; Dignāga’s Words of the Pakṣa says: “We see [it] entertaining doubt with regard to the object — therefore not ascertainment.”
- On a pseudo-sign (རྟགས་ལྟར་སྣང་): Dignāga’s verse — “[A pseudo-sign,] powerless with regard to the thesis, produces doubt and ascertainment of the unwanted” — places the cognition under one of the three already-recognised non-valid types (inconclusive → doubt; contradictory → wrong cognition; unestablished → non-realising).
- On a correct sign (རྟགས་ཡང་དག་): then it is valid cognition — viz. inference — by the same proof that establishes inferential valid cognition.
In all three branches, ཡིད་དཔྱོད་ is something else. Hence it is refuted from the root.
Appearing-but-not-ascertained
The early Tibetans claimed all cognitions in this category are non-valid. But the Svavṛtti (Dignāga’s autocommentary on the pramanasamuccaya) says: “Direct perception does not ascertain anything whatsoever; that which it apprehends, that too is apprehended not by way of ascertainment, but by appearing as such (དེར་སྣང་བས་).” If the category were non-valid by definition, all direct perception would be non-valid — absurd.
Direct subsequent cognition
See subsequent-cognition — the threefold contradiction (object, time, mode of apprehension) blocks any “direct” (non-conceptual) subsequent cognition.
Bounding Pervasions (ཁྱབ་མཐའ་)
The slides close with a list of formal pervasions for the system. Selected:
- If non-valid → one of the three (non-realising, wrong conceptuality, doubt). ✓
- If non-valid → does not realise its own object. ✓
- If non-valid → lacks an apprehended object (གཟུང་ཡུལ་) and an object of engagement (འཇུག་ཡུལ་). ✓
- If non-valid → is a mistaken cognition (འཁྲུལ་བའི་བློ་). ✓
- If mistaken cognition → not necessarily non-valid. Example: inference — mistaken with respect to its appearing object (the universal), yet valid with respect to its object of engagement.
- If non-valid → not necessarily an object-possessor whose object disagrees with the fact. Example: the subsequent-cognition ascertaining a vase — non-valid yet its object accords with the fact.
- If a cognition relies on a non-established sign (རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་) → non-realising. ✓ (Reverse fails: not all non-realising cognitions involve a non-established sign — e.g. the subsequent cognition apprehending a vase.)
- If relies on a contradictory sign (འགལ་རྟགས་) → wrong cognition. ✓ (Reverse fails: e.g. two-moon sense-cognition is wrong cognition without relying on any sign.)
- If relies on an inconclusive sign (མ་ངེས་པ་) → doubt. ✓
- If grasps a mere thesis without sign or experience → latent doubt. ✓
- If manifest doubt → entertains a “two-pointed” (ཙེ་གཉིས་) doubt with respect to its object. ✓
- If the object of a non-conceptual wrong cognition → necessarily non-existent.
- If the object of a conceptual wrong cognition → not necessarily non-existent (e.g. the meaning-universal of “permanent sound” exists as a mental image).
- If the object of a non-realising cognition → not necessarily existent (e.g. “the son of a barren woman”).
The Geluk bsdus grwa Counter-Position (Perdue 2014)
perdue-buddhist-reasoning-debate is the cleanest modern English statement of the very position the Treasury refutes. Perdue presents a seven-fold graded typology of cognitions (Ch. 12, pp. 293–305) ordered from least to most reliable. Below, we render Perdue’s English variants into our glossary-preferred Tibetan-anchored terms (with Perdue’s wording in parentheses):
- Wrong cognition (Perdue: “wrong consciousness”, ལོག་ཤེས་)
- Doubt (Perdue: “uncertain consciousness”, ཐེ་ཚོམ་) leaning toward what is not factual
- Equivocating doubt
- Doubt leaning toward what is factual
- Investigative thought (Perdue: “correctly assuming consciousness”, ཡིད་དཔྱོད་)
- Inference (Perdue: “inferential cognizer”, རྗེས་དཔག་) — valid
- Direct perception (Perdue: “direct perceiver”, མངོན་སུམ་) — valid
The three doubt-grades collapse to the Sa-gya doubt (ཐེ་ཚོམ་), so the underlying classification reduces to the early-Tibetan five-type list (wrong cognition, doubt, inattentive, investigative thought, subsequent — though Perdue does not name subsequent-cognition in this scheme).
Perdue’s working definition of investigative thought is given in two formulations (which we retain verbatim with Perdue’s wording, since they are direct quotations):
“A knower that does not get at an object with respect to which superimpositions have been eliminated although it adheres one-pointedly to the phenomenon which is its principal object of engagement.” (Perdue p. 298)
Alternative definition:
“A mind newly and one-pointedly determining its own true object, which is devoid of either of the two ascertainments — that is, does not actually eliminate superimpositions in dependence on either the power of experience or a reason that is its basis.” (p. 299, citing the Tutor’s Collected Topics)
Three sub-types are admitted in the Geluk bsdus grwa (p. 299): investigative thought without a reason, with a reason not yet ascertained, and depending on a faulty reason. Sapan’s dilemma against ཡིད་དཔྱོད་ (see “mental-cogitation dilemma” above) maps exactly onto these three: without-a-reason = latent doubt; faulty-reason = doubt or wrong cognition; reason-not-yet-ascertained = sequence not yet completed (would be doubt if non-relying, inference if relying on a correct sign). Perdue presents the category as unproblematic and does not engage the Treasury’s objections.
Perdue also makes explicit the additional “consciousness to which an object appears but is not ascertained” (snang la ma nges pa, p. 292) — the early-Tibetan appearance-without-ascertainment (Perdue: “inattentive cognition”) — and treats it as a perfectly legitimate type, not as the Sa-gya does (a pseudo-classification refuted by the Svavṛtti).
Sources
- dzongsar-class-cognition — definitions, sub-divisions, examples, refutation of the five-type list, bounding pervasions
- sonam-introduction-treasury — Treasury Ch. 2 framing; Sapan’s threefold classification; rejection of investigative thought (Sönam: “correctly assuming consciousness”, ཡིད་དཔྱོད་) and appearance-without-ascertainment (Sönam: “inattentive cognition”, སྣང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པ་)
- valid-cognition — the complement; definitions and the novelty requirement that grounds the classification
- gorampa-pramanavartika — Sa-gya commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika’s Establishment of Valid Cognition chapter
- perdue-buddhist-reasoning-debate — the Geluk bsdus grwa seven-fold typology (Ch. 12, pp. 293–305); the inherited Collected Topics definition of investigative thought (Perdue: “correctly assuming consciousness”, ཡིད་དཔྱོད་); the position Sapan’s Treasury Ch. 2 refutes