Subsequent Cognition (བཅད་ཤེས་)
A conceptual cognition that re-apprehends an object already realised by a preceding valid cognition — paradigmatically, the moment-after-perception thought “that is a vase,” which adds nothing new to what direct perception already presented. In the Sa-gya system inherited from sakya-pandita and gorampa, subsequent cognition is non-valid (non-valid-cognition) because it fails Dharmakīrti’s novelty requirement: it does not reveal an unknown thing (see valid-cognition). It is, however, a true cognition (its conceived object accords with the fact); its non-validity lies elsewhere.
Root verse
མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་བྲལ་ད་ལྟར་བ། ། བཅད་ཤེས་འདས་པ་དྲན་པ་ཡིན། ། ཡུལ་དུས་འཛིན་སྟངས་འགལ་བ་ལ། ། གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ནི་ག་ལོ་སྲིད། །
Direct perception is free from conceptuality and pertains to the present; subsequent cognition is the memory of what is past. Since [they] differ in object, time, and mode of apprehension, how could there possibly be any common locus [between them]?
[Source unidentified in the class slides — likely a Sa-gya summary verse on this topic; verification pending.]
The Threefold Contradiction with Direct Perception
perception and subsequent cognition have no common locus (གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་), because they are mutually contradictory in three respects:
1. Contradiction in essential nature (ངོ་བོ་)
- Direct perception is free of conceptuality (རྟོག་བྲལ་)
- Subsequent cognition is conceptual (རྟོག་པ་)
2. Contradiction in time (དུས་)
- Direct perception apprehends its object as present, in the manner of an aspect (རྣམ་པ་) having arisen
- Subsequent cognition apprehends its object as past, in the manner of recollection
The Sa-gya argument against any “direct subsequent cognition”: the apprehended object (གཟུང་ཡུལ་) of any cognition is its cause, and so must precede it. A subsequent cognition of “the vase already realised” therefore takes as its object the past vase — never the present one — and so cannot share a moment of object with the direct perception that originally apprehended that vase.
3. Contradiction in object (ཡུལ་)
- The appearing object (སྣང་ཡུལ་) of direct perception is the specifically-characterised (རང་མཚན་)
- The appearing object of subsequent cognition is the generally-characterised (སྤྱི་མཚན་)
4. Contradiction in mode of apprehension (འཛིན་སྟངས་)
- Direct perception: object appears clearly and unmixed (གསལ་བར་)
- Subsequent cognition: a past object appears unclearly (མི་གསལ་བར་), via memory
Why Subsequent Cognition is Non-Valid
It fails the second of Dharmakīrti’s two characterisations of valid cognition (see valid-cognition): it does not “reveal an unknown thing.” Instead, it apprehends “by way of adding on (བསྣན་ནས་) [a further apprehension] to the vase that has already been apprehended by the prior valid cognition that induces it (འདྲེན་བྱེད་)” (dzongsar-class-cognition).
In the Sa-gya tripartite classification, the standard “vase-ascertaining subsequent cognition” (བུམ་པ་ངེས་པའི་བཅད་ཤེས་) is the paradigm example of non-realising cognition (མ་རྟོགས་པ་) — specifically of the sub-type “not realising because the object-to-be-realised is absent.” The vase as object-to-be-realised has already been exhausted by the prior valid cognition; nothing fresh remains to be realised. The subsequent cognition still has a conceived object (ཞེན་ཡུལ་) — the vase — but no fresh object-to-be-realised. See non-valid-cognition.
Edge cases
The slides flag two cases that look like counter-examples:
- The second moment of inferential valid cognition — looks like subsequent cognition (recollective), but the Sa-gya position is that the meditative-equipoise gnosis on the path of meditation must not be classed as direct perception by this criterion, since it engages contrary to opposing-side superimpositions without letting lapse its operation on the already-realised object. The threading is delicate.
- Memory — Dharmakīrti’s exclusion of memory from valid cognition (see valid-cognition §Novelty) is the structural basis of subsequent cognition’s non-validity: every subsequent cognition is a kind of recollection.
Sa-gya rejection of “direct subsequent cognition”
Cha-pa and the early Tibetans had attempted to admit a direct (non-conceptual) species of subsequent cognition. Sapan refutes this on the grounds of the threefold contradiction above: any cognition that re-apprehends an already-realised object cannot be present-tense and clearly-aspectual, hence cannot be direct perception (sonam-introduction-treasury; dzongsar-class-cognition).
Sources
- dzongsar-class-cognition — root verse with running commentary; threefold contradiction with direct perception; placement within the Sa-gya non-valid-cognition system
- sonam-introduction-treasury — Sapan’s threefold non-valid-cognition classification (Treasury Ch. 2)
- pramanavartika — implicit basis: Dharmakīrti’s novelty requirement excludes memory and subsequent cognition from valid cognition