Subsequent Cognition (བཅད་ཤེས་)
A conceptual cognition that re-apprehends an object already realised by a preceding valid cognition — paradigmatically, the moment-after-perception thought “that is a vase,” which adds nothing new to what direct perception already presented. In the Sakya system inherited from sakya-pandita and gorampa, subsequent cognition is non-valid (non-valid-cognition) because it fails Dharmakīrti’s novelty requirement: it does not reveal an unknown thing (see valid-cognition). It is, however, a true cognition (its conceived object accords with the fact); its non-validity lies elsewhere.
Root verse
མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་བྲལ་ད་ལྟར་བ། ། བཅད་ཤེས་འདས་པ་དྲན་པ་ཡིན། ། ཡུལ་དུས་འཛིན་སྟངས་འགལ་བ་ལ། ། གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ནི་ག་ལ་སྲིད། །
Direct perception is free from conceptuality and pertains to the present; subsequent cognition is the memory of what is past. Since [they] differ in object, time, and mode of apprehension, how could there possibly be any common locus [between them]?
The verse is quoted without attribution in the class material. It is probably a Sakya summary verse on the topic, but the source is [unverified].
The Threefold Contradiction with Direct Perception
perception and subsequent cognition have no common locus (གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་), because they are mutually contradictory. The consequence as the class material states it names three respects, matching the root verse: object (ཡུལ་), time (དུས་) and mode of apprehension (འཛིན་སྟངས་). The proof then opens with a fourth, contradiction in essential nature, marked as an addition (དེ་ཡང་) rather than as one of the three. Four are argued and three are claimed; which of the four is meant to drop out is not said (dzongsar-class-cognition).
The four, in the order the commentary gives them:
1. Contradiction in essential nature (ངོ་བོ་)
- Direct perception is free of conceptuality (རྟོག་བྲལ་)
- Subsequent cognition is conceptual (རྟོག་པ་)
2. Contradiction in time (དུས་)
- Direct perception apprehends its object as present, in the manner of an aspect (རྣམ་པ་) having arisen
- Subsequent cognition apprehends its object as past, in the manner of recollection
This is the respect the class debate presses hardest; see below.
3. Contradiction in object (ཡུལ་)
- The appearing object (སྣང་ཡུལ་) of direct perception is the specifically-characterised (རང་མཚན་)
- The appearing object of subsequent cognition is the generally-characterised (སྤྱི་མཚན་)
4. Contradiction in mode of apprehension (འཛིན་སྟངས་)
- Direct perception: object appears clearly and unmixed (གསལ་བར་)
- Subsequent cognition: a past object appears unclearly (མི་གསལ་བར་), via memory
Why Subsequent Cognition is Non-Valid
It fails the second of Dharmakīrti’s two characterisations of valid cognition (see valid-cognition): it does not “reveal an unknown thing.” Instead, it apprehends “by way of adding on (བསྣན་ནས་) [a further apprehension] to the vase that has already been apprehended by the prior valid cognition that induces it (འདྲེན་བྱེད་)” (dzongsar-class-cognition).
In the Sakya classification it sits at the third level of division, not the first. Non-realising cognition (མ་རྟོགས་པ་) divides into three, of which the third is failing to realise despite having completed the search (རྫོགས་ཀྱང་མ་རྙེད་); that in turn divides into three, of which the first is failing to realise because the object-to-be-realised is absent (རྟོགས་བྱའི་ཡུལ་མེད་). The example given for it is the subsequent cognition apprehending a vase (བུམ་པ་འཛིན་པའི་བཅད་ཤེས་). The vase as object-to-be-realised has been exhausted by the prior valid cognition and nothing fresh remains. It is not thereby objectless: the vase is still its conceived object (ཞེན་ཡུལ་). See non-valid-cognition.
The commentator does not let the classification stand unchallenged. Read at the literal wording of the text, the second sub-type — failing to realise because the realising cognition is corrupted (སླད་པ་) — over-extends (ཧ་ཅང་ཐལ་བ་). A vase-ascertaining subsequent cognition (བུམ་པ་ངེས་པའི་བཅད་ཤེས་) in the mind-stream of someone corrupted by grasping sound as permanent satisfies the second sub-type as well as the first, since that mind-stream does fail to realise the momentariness of sound. Which sub-type such a case belongs to is left open here (dzongsar-class-cognition).
The objections in the class material
The commentary attached to the root verse is a debate exercise, not an exposition. It takes the differences one at a time and presses each (dzongsar-class-cognition).
Against difference of object. The claim that whatever is an object of direct perception is thereby not an object of subsequent cognition fails on all four kinds of object. If appearing object (སྣང་ཡུལ་) is meant, the gnosis of the path of meditation and the knowledge of all aspects are counter-examples; if conceived object (ཞེན་ཡུལ་) is meant, a pot is.
Against difference of time. Say that direct perception’s object is present and subsequent cognition’s is past. Then a single pot is not something whose time has already passed at the moment of both cognitions. That cannot be accepted, because the apprehended object (གཟུང་ཡུལ་) is the cause of a cognition and so must precede it, which makes the pot past for the direct perception as well and collapses the difference in time.
Three attempts to say what makes subsequent cognition recollective are then knocked down in turn:
- “It recollects what has already been realised.” Then it recollects nothing, since it has itself realised no phenomenon.
- “It recollects what was realised by the preceding valid cognition that induces it (འདྲེན་བྱེད་).” Then the second moment of an inferential valid cognition is a subsequent cognition, since it answers the description exactly.
- The same description carries a worse consequence: the meditative-equipoise gnosis of the path of meditation would not be direct perception, because it too engages its object contrary to the superimpositions of the opposing side without letting its operation on the already-realised object lapse.
Against difference in mode of apprehension. The extract states the consequence and breaks off mid-argument. None of the three objections is answered in the material available here, so the Sakya reply to them is [unverified].
Memory. Dharmakīrti’s exclusion of memory from valid cognition (see valid-cognition §Novelty) is the structural basis of subsequent cognition’s non-validity: every subsequent cognition is a kind of recollection.
Sakya rejection of “direct subsequent cognition”
Cha-pa and the early Tibetans had attempted to admit a direct (non-conceptual) species of subsequent cognition. Sapan refutes this on the grounds of the threefold contradiction above: any cognition that re-apprehends an already-realised object cannot be present-tense and clearly-aspectual, hence cannot be direct perception (sonam-introduction-treasury; dzongsar-class-cognition).
Sources
- dzongsar-class-cognition — root verse with running commentary; threefold contradiction with direct perception; placement within the Sakya non-valid-cognition system
- sonam-introduction-treasury — Sapan’s threefold non-valid-cognition classification (Treasury Ch. 2)
- pramanavartika — implicit basis: Dharmakīrti’s novelty requirement excludes memory and subsequent cognition from valid cognition