Dzongsar Pramāṇa Class Slides — Cognition; Universals and Particulars
Tibetan-script class slides (with English translation glosses by Tenpa) from a Pramāṇa course at Dzongsar Institute. The notes follow the Sa-gya curriculum, drawing principally on the སྡེ་བདུན་རབ་གསལ་ (Gorampa’s Clarification of the Seven Treatises) and on Dharmakīrti’s pramanavartika, the pramanasamuccaya together with Dignāga’s Svavṛtti, and the Pramāṇaviniścaya (རྣམ་ངེས་).
Scope
Two interlocking topics from the Treasury’s second and third chapters:
- Investigation of Cognition (བློ་བརྟག་པ་) — the definition of cognition (གསལ་ཞིང་རིག་པ་, “clear and knowing”), the threefold division of cognition (by object, essential nature, and mode of engagement), the early Tibetan five-fold list of non-valid cognitions and its refutation, and the Sa-gya tripartite system: non-realising cognition (མ་རྟོགས་པ་), wrong conceptuality (ལོག་རྟོག་), and doubt (ཐེ་ཚོམ་), with full definitions, sub-divisions, and pervasions (ཁྱབ་མཐའ་).
- Universals and Particulars (སྤྱི་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་) — analysis of meaning-universals (དོན་སྤྱི་), substance (རྫས་), the disqualification of vase as a permanent example, the standard Sa-gya definition of a particular as “combination of two reverses” (ལྡོག་པ་ཉིས་ཚོགས་), and refutations of universal-instance same-substance by analysing entity, cause, and arising/ceasing.
- A separate opening passage on subsequent cognition (བཅད་ཤེས་), built from a four-line root verse with running commentary: direct perception and subsequent cognition contradict in object, time, and mode of apprehension — therefore have no common locus.
Key Doctrinal Material
Definition of cognition
བློའི་མཚན་ཉིད། གསལ་ཞིང་རིག་པ།
“Clear and knowing.” Glossed: clarity (གསལ་) = the cognition’s own nature is unobscured by anything; knowing (རིག་) = its own nature is not hidden from itself. (Compare mental-activity.)
Threefold division:
- By object: non-conceptual (རྟོག་མེད་) and conceptual (རྟོག་བཅས་).
- By essential nature: mistaken (འཁྲུལ་) and unmistaken (མ་འཁྲུལ་).
- By mode of engagement: not-yet-engaged (ཡུལ་ལ་མ་ཞུགས་པ་), currently engaging (འཇུག་བཞིན་པ་), and finished engaging (ཞུགས་ཟིན་པ་).
When condensed, the three modes of engagement are subsumed solely within self-awareness (རང་རིག་པ་). See self-awareness.
Refutation of the five non-valid cognitions of the early Tibetans
Cha-pa, Tsur-tön, and others held five non-valid cognitions: investigative thought (class slides: “mental cogitation”, ཡིད་དཔྱོད་), appearance-without-ascertainment (class slides: “appearing-but-not-ascertained”, སྣང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པ་), subsequent cognition (བཅད་ཤེས་), wrong cognition (ལོག་ཤེས་), and doubt (ཐེ་ཚོམ་). The Sa-gya system refutes:
- Mental cogitation — refuted from the root (རྩད་ནས་). The dilemma: does it depend on a sign or not? If not, it grasps a mere thesis — that is doubt (citing the Pramāṇaviniścaya and Dignāga’s Words of the Pakṣa). If yes — pseudo-sign or correct sign? Pseudo-sign produces doubt or wrong cognition; correct sign yields inference — a valid cognition. Hence “mental cogitation” reduces to one of the three already-recognised categories.
- Appearing-but-not-ascertained — the claim that all such cognitions are non-valid is refuted, citing the Svavṛtti: “Direct perception does not ascertain anything whatsoever; that which it apprehends, that too is apprehended not by way of ascertainment, but by appearing as such (དེར་སྣང་བས་).” If the category were non-valid by definition, all direct perception would be non-valid.
- Subsequent cognition — the claim that direct perception is included within it is refuted by their threefold incompatibility (object, time, mode of apprehension). See subsequent-cognition.
Sa-gya threefold non-valid cognition
The substantive content for the new pages non-valid-cognition (umbrella + doubt + wrong conceptuality + non-realising) and subsequent-cognition.
Universals and particulars (from the སྡེ་བདུན་རབ་གསལ་)
Two parallel lists are equated:
- Functional/specifically-characterised: རང་མཚན་ ≡ instance (གསལ་བ་) ≡ functional thing (དངོས་པོ་) ≡ substance (རྫས་) ≡ ultimate (དོན་དམ་པ་) — all able to perform a function (དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ་), all unmixed in place, time, and nature.
- Conceptual/generally-characterised: སྤྱི་མཚན་ ≡ universal (སྤྱི་) ≡ other-elimination (གཞན་སེལ་) ≡ reverse (ལྡོག་པ་) ≡ exclusion (རྣམ་བཅད་) ≡ the mixed (འདྲེས་པ་) ≡ relation (འབྲེལ་བ་) ≡ conventional (ཀུན་རྫོབ་) — none able to perform a function.
The slides establish: meaning-universals (དོན་སྤྱི་) in your conceptual cognition are themselves unmixed in place, time, and nature (each meaning-universal exists inside one person’s body, at one time, with its own nature) — so they cannot be the metaphysical “mixed” thing the realist wants. They are conceptual constructs, not real universals.
The vase is not established as a substance and is therefore unsuitable as a similar example for proving sound impermanent: “A permanent vase does not work as a similar example.” Five refuters of the claim “vase is permanent” (from the Sde-bdun rab-gsal): direct perception, fact-power inference (དངོས་སྟོབས་རྗེས་དཔག་), scripture (ལུང་), the opponent’s own assertion (ཁས་བླངས་), and contradiction by one’s own words (རང་ཚིག་གིས་གནོད་པ་).
Definition of particular (བྱེ་བྲག་): “A superimposition (སྒྲོ་བཏགས་) appearing as a combination of two reverses (ལྡོག་པ་ཉིས་ཚོགས་) — that which is reversed both from the dissimilar class (རིགས་མི་མཐུན་) and from [some members] of the similar class (རིགས་མཐུན་).”
This yields the consequence: if X is a particular of Y, X is not necessarily Y itself (the meaning-universal of śapa tree is a particular relative to “tree” but is not itself the universal “tree”).
Refutation of universal–instance one-substance
Three angles, each with a dilemma (from the Sde-bdun rab-gsal):
- By analysis of entity (ངོ་བོ་): is the universal “tree” the substance of śapa or not? If yes, then shukpa (juniper) — being one substance with that universal — is śapa (absurd). If no, the universal and the instance are not one substance.
- By analysis of cause (རྒྱུ་): did the universal arise from the cause of śapa? If yes, blocking the cause of śapa blocks the universal; if no, no causal connection — therefore not one substance.
- By analysis of arising and ceasing (སྐྱེ་འཇིག་): if the universal “tree” arose and ceased with each śapa, every spatially/temporally/aspectually distinct instance of “tree” would arise and cease in lockstep with this śapa — absurd.
Material absorbed into problem-of-universals and specifically-characterised.
Translation Check
The opening passage gives a four-line Tibetan root verse with running commentary on subsequent cognition. The verse:
མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་བྲལ་ད་ལྟར་བ། ། བཅད་ཤེས་འདས་པ་དྲན་པ་ཡིན། ། ཡུལ་དུས་འཛིན་སྟངས་འགལ་བ་ལ། ། གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ནི་ག་ལོ་སྲིད། །
with the rendering:
“Direct perception is free from conceptuality and pertains to the present; subsequent cognition is the memory of what is past. Since [they] differ in object, time, and mode of apprehension, how could there possibly be any common locus [between them]?”
The slides do not identify the source. The verse style and content suggest a Sa-gya summary verse — possibly from the pramanayuktanidhi (Ch. 2, བློ་བརྟག་པ་) or from Gorampa’s auto-commentary, but this needs verification before being included in translations/. The slides also embed shorter quoted lines from Dignāga (a verse on pseudo-signs: “ཕྱོགས་ལ་མཐུ་མེད་སོམ་ཉི་དང་། །མི་འདོད་འདོད་པའི་ངེས་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད།”), the Svavṛtti, and the Pramāṇaviniścaya; none of these are full chapters or verses suitable for direct lifting into the translation files.
Action for translation sessions: verify the four-line opening verse against the Treasury Ch. 2 root text and Gorampa’s commentary; if it is a Treasury root verse, add to translations/pramanayuktanidhi/chapter-2-cognition. Otherwise file as a citation in the relevant concept page.
Citations index (slide tally)
The slides close with a citation count: Pramāṇaviniścaya ×6, pramanavartika ×10, pramanasamuccaya ×1, Svavṛtti ×1, Abhidharma ×1.
Relevance
Directly enriches:
- non-valid-cognition (new) — full definitions, divisions, sub-divisions, examples, and pervasions for ཚད་མིན་
- subsequent-cognition (new) — root verse + threefold contradiction with perception
- valid-cognition — Sa-gya refutation of the five-type early-Tibetan scheme
- problem-of-universals — Sde-bdun rab-gsal material on the unmixedness of meaning-universals; the three-angle refutation of universal–instance same-substance; the disqualification of “permanent vase”
- specifically-characterised / generally-characterised — the parallel-list equivalences
- inference — pseudo-sign categories: inconclusive (produces doubt), contradictory (produces ascertainment of the unwanted), unestablished