Pramana Wiki

Vaibhāṣika

21 min read

Vaibhāṣika (བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བ་)

The Vaibhāṣika is the lowest of the four Buddhist tenet systems in the ascending order the commentaries here use: Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, each clearer than the last on the nature of mind (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 5). In this material it is treated almost entirely as an opponent rather than as a stage the epistemologist passes through. It holds that the sense faculty (དབང་པོ་), not consciousness, is what sees; that object and cognition exist at the same moment; and that cognition carries no aspect (རྣམ་པ་) of its object. dignaga does not name it anywhere in the pramanasamuccaya material surveyed here. dharmakirti answers it twice in pramanavartika chapter 2 and at length in chapter 3. The Pramāṇayuktanidhi names it in chapters 1, 4 and 9, and the commentary adds it as one of the targets of chapter 7. The chapter 1 refutation is the one that matters, and its real target is not the Indian school: the position sakya-pandita attacks there is the one he says the early Tibetan epistemologists had adopted without acknowledging whose it was.

One thing to fix before reading further. Vaibhāṣika (བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བ་) and Vaiśeṣika (བྱེ་བྲག་པ་) are different schools, one Buddhist and one not, and their Tibetan names differ by three syllables. The translation notes flag the confusion where Sakya Paṇḍita’s “Owl School” epithet is at issue, since that epithet targets the Vaiśeṣika only (Pramāṇayuktanidhi translation notes, chapter 3).

Overview

The name is a derivative of vibhāṣā: a Vaibhāṣika is an adherent of the Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra, the encyclopedic commentary compiled around the reign of Kaniṣka (c. 127–150 CE) that fixed the orthodoxy of the Kashmiri branch of the Sarvāstivāda. The parent tradition emerged in north India under the Mauryas, dated to the third or the second century BCE depending on the account, with Kātyāyanīputra (c. 150 BCE) named as the author of its base text, the Jñānaprasthāna. It remained one of the most influential monastic and scholastic groupings of northern India and Central Asia until roughly the seventh century (Wikipedia; the two Wikipedia articles differ on the emergence date, and the divergence is reported here rather than resolved). What survives is not a community but a position: its Abhidharma is read as a doxographical stance in Tibetan and East Asian scholasticism, and the related Mūlasarvāstivāda ordination lineage continues in Tibetan Buddhism (Wikipedia).

Dreyfus notes that the Tibetan doxographical tradition, which these texts follow, uses “Vaibhāṣika” for a position more accurately described as Sarvāstivāda (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 484 n. 5). The doctrine the name carries in that usage is sarvāstitva, all exists: dharmas hold their own nature across past, present and future, only the present ones exercising causal efficacy (Wikipedia).

Two features of the ontology matter for what follows. First, the criterion of the real. The school counts as ultimate (paramārtha-satya, དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་) only what resists physical destruction or analysis into components, and lists seventy-five such phenomena; a jar ceases to exist when broken, water when analysed into its atoms, so both are only conventionally real, whereas taste and smell keep their identity under reduction and are therefore real (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 84–85). Second, the tension this generates. The list includes both the four elements and the five kinds of sensibilia (colour, sound, odour, taste, touch), and sensibilia are not atomic components but observable entities. If a colour is a collection of atoms, it should reduce like the water. Dreyfus takes the system to be delimiting reality by two contradictory criteria, an atomic theory grafted onto an older phenomenological analysis of matter, and reads Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika revision as the attempt to repair it by admitting only the four elements as substances (same pages, and p. 484 n. 7).

The school is nonetheless a realism about the elements, not about the furniture of the world. Sakya Chok-den’s observation, which Dreyfus endorses against the Tibetan drift towards commonsense realism, is that no Indian proponent of either the Sautrāntika or the Vaibhāṣika view accepted commonsense objects as real at the ontological level (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 97). And on the person the school is at one with its Buddhist rivals: Gorampa records that all realist tenet holders from the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika upward take the ascription of experiencing and remembering to a person as mere designation, what withstands analysis being the aggregates (gorampa-pramanavartika, on PV II.270).

Core doctrines

The sense faculty is what sees

The argument, as the Pramāṇayuktanidhi states it, runs from obstruction. Consciousness is immaterial and so cannot be blocked; if consciousness were the seer, walls and mountains would be no impediment, and we would see through them. Since we do not, the seer must be the physical faculty together with its support (Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 1, with sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 1). The view goes back to Abhidharmakośa I.42ab, which says that form screened off by something else is not seen (translation notes to Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 1). The same claim appears in the pramanavartika as an objection to the definition of valid cognition (ཚད་མ་): Gorampa gives it as the charge that the word “consciousness” in that definition suffers the fault of impossibility, since a consciousness could not exist upon the material sense power, and the sense power is an illustration of the definition (gorampa-pramanavartika, on PV II.3).

Object and cognition exist together, and cognition bears no aspect

The two halves are one position. Because the school denies that consciousness apprehends through an intermediary, it must have the object present when the cognition of it occurs, and therefore holds subject and object to coexist despite standing as cause and effect. Dreyfus classes it with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Jain as a proponent of no-aspect (རྣམ་པ་མེད་པར་སྨྲ་བ་, nirākāravāda): consciousness is amorphous, does not change with its object, and reveals it as a lamp reveals what it lights (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 335–336). Awareness holds its object “nakedly”, without carrying in itself any mark of the apprehension (p. 411). What lets the school afford this is its account of duration: things persist unchanged for a time rather than perishing at each instant, so a cause can still be there after producing its effect (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 61 and p. 547 n. 33).

Dreyfus enters one qualification worth keeping. The view is direct realism but not commonsense realism: what is directly apprehended is the sensible quality, not the everyday object. One does not see an apple; one sees the apple’s colour. Realist about the colour, phenomenalist about the apple (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 336).

There is no self-awareness

The school accepts three perceptions where the Sautrāntika accepts four, self-awareness (རང་རིག་) being the one it drops. Sodargye gives the reason as its holding that the cognition of any phenomenon completes in two moments, so nothing is left for a reflexive faculty to do. On mental perception (ཡིད་ཀྱི་མངོན་སུམ་) the Abhidharmakośa is unclear, and Gorampa and others credit the school with accepting it only indirectly, on the ground that it accepts both the sense consciousnesses and the sixth consciousness, and that a sense consciousness ceasing without interval produces the mental faculty (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 9). The count is stated in the root text as one of four school-by-school correlations:

།མངོན་སུམ་བཞི་པོ་མདོ་སྡེའི་ལུགས། །བྱེ་བྲག་སྨྲ་གསུམ་རྣམ་རིག་གཉིས།

The four perceptions [accord with] the Sautrāntika system; the Vaibhāṣikas [accept] three, the Cittamātrins two. (Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 9)

The unconditioned is substantially real

Space and the two cessations are, for this school, substantial entities rather than mere absences, analytic cessation being a “separation-from-bondage” with a substance of its own. The Pramāṇayuktanidhi pairs the school with the Vaiśeṣika on this, as the two camps that take the unconditioned (འདུས་མ་བྱས་) to be really permanent. The root calls them “the two proponents of permanence”; the auto-commentary and Sodargye identify them as the Vaiśeṣikas and the Vaibhāṣikas, each “and others”:

།འདུས་མ་བྱས་རྣམས་མ་གྲུབ་ན། །རྟག་པར་བཤད་པ་འགལ་ཞེ་ན། །མུ་སྟེགས་བྱེད་དང་ཉན་ཐོས་ཀྱི། །རྟག་སྨྲ་གཉིས་པོ་རྟག་པར་འདོད། །ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པ་མི་རྟག་པ། །ལོག་ལ་རྟག་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་འདོགས།

If you say, “If the unconditioned [phenomena] are not established, this contradicts [their] being explained as permanent”: the non-Buddhists and the Hearers, the two proponents of permanence, hold [them] to be permanent; Dharmakīrti imputes the convention ‘permanent’ to what is distinguished from the impermanent. (Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 4)

The same chapter records a related commitment. Blue and impermanence are separate entities for the Vaibhāṣika, blue belonging to the form aggregate and impermanence being a non-associated formation in the formation aggregate, so that the five aggregates are pulled apart at the level of entity and not merely in thought. From the Sautrāntika upward they are pulled apart only in conception, which is why one sees a sapphire’s colour, shape, impermanence and producedness in a single act of seeing (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 4).

Where the epistemologists stand

Nothing in the pramanasamuccaya material engages the school, by name or by position. Dignāga’s refutations there are directed at the Nyāya, the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā; the intra-Buddhist argument in the material here is with the Vātsīputrīya and with rival readings of his own definitions. The Vaibhāṣika enters this tradition with Dharmakīrti and stays in it through the Tibetan commentators.

Where it does enter, the position taken is uniform. Sakya Paṇḍita’s auto-commentary on chapter 1 sets out the frame: when the Sage examined external things he accepted atoms, when he examined conventional reality he accepted mind-only, and when he entered ultimate reality he taught freedom from elaborations. Gorampa maps the schools onto these levels. The Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika belong to the first, the two branches of Mind-Only (true and false aspect) to the second, and the Madhyamaka to the third. He adds that Dharmakīrti refutes the Vaibhāṣika view that a sense consciousness grasps an external object simultaneous with it, nakedly and without an aspect, and provisionally accepts the Sautrāntika account in its place (auto-commentary and Gorampa on Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 1). Sakya Paṇḍita’s own account of cognition in chapter 1 follows the same order: the Sautrāntika position is reached by refuting the Vaibhāṣika and then the early Tibetans who had followed it, and the Yogācāra position by refuting the Sautrāntika in turn (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 1). Gorampa names one doctrinal marker of the difference. For the Sautrāntika, “substance”, “entity” and “specifically characterised phenomenon” all coincide exactly with what is produced and impermanent; for the Vaibhāṣika they do not, since its substances include the permanent unconditioned (Gorampa on Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 1). The Vaibhāṣika is the bottom rung, and the ascent does not carry anything up from it. Chapter 9 makes the same ordering explicit for the theory of valid cognition and result: the Vaibhāṣika scheme is untenable outright, the Sautrāntika scheme holds “under slight examination”, the Cittamātra scheme under subtle examination (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 9).

What makes this more than doxography is that Sakya Paṇḍita thought his Tibetan predecessors had settled on the bottom rung. Sodargye reports him saying in the auto-commentary, in a displeased tone, that he follows the two Masters of Reasoning, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, while the early epistemologists follow the Vaibhāṣika (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 9). The charge has a named target close to home. Sakya Paṇḍita’s own teacher, Tsurtön Zhönnu Sengé, wrote in his Lamp of Wisdom on Valid Cognition (ཚད་མ་ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེ་) that, although the two masters framed their epistemology on the Sautrāntika and then the false-aspect Yogācāra model, the Vaibhāṣika system is the more viable when things are examined as they actually are (Tsurtön Zhönnu Sengé, Lamp of Wisdom, p. 141). Dreyfus documents the same charge from the other side and finds it substantially right. Cha-ba, reading Dharmakīrti as ultimately a Mādhyamika whose epistemology must answer to convention, rejected the Sautrāntika causal theory of perception (how can objects and perceptions be known to resemble each other, or to be cause and effect, if we have no access to the objects apart from the perceptions?) and proposed direct realism in its place (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 194, 380–381). Dreyfus calls that a Vaibhāṣika theory of perception, “naive” direct realism, and observes that it solves the time-gap problem cleanly precisely because it grants objects real duration (pp. 380, 388). Sakya Paṇḍita’s answer to that programme is a single line of chapter 1, which Dreyfus quotes as the reply to Cha-ba (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 115):

།ཀུན་རྫོབ་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྲགས་པ་ལ། །བརྟེན་ན་ཚད་མའི་རྣམ་གཞག་འགལ།

If, for the relative, one relies on the common renown of the world, the system of valid cognition falls into contradiction. (Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 1)

An epistemology built to overcome the limits of common sense cannot be held to the standard it was made to overturn.

The later Tibetan settlement went to Sakya Paṇḍita on this point without going to him on much else. Gyel-tsap and Kay-drup follow his description of Dharmakīrti’s system as Sautrāntika-Yogācāra and adopt the Sautrāntika causal theory of perception, declining Cha-ba’s combination of Madhyamaka philosophy with a Vaibhāṣika theory of perception (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, pp. 33, 382). Ge-luk thinkers take the time-gap problem seriously and dismiss the Vaibhāṣika account of causality as incoherent, retaining Dharmakīrti’s aspect as the device for reconciling direct apprehension with the gap (p. 411). What they kept from Cha-ba was the equation of held object and appearing object, which Sakya Chok-den argued was invented to refute the causal theory, not to explain it: “piling one mistake on top of the other” (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 385).

Intra-Buddhist criticism

Dharmakīrti

Two exchanges in chapter 2, and one extended argument in chapter 3.

The first is the definitional objection at the head of the chapter. Against the claim that the material sense faculty is what cognises, the reply separates two results of a valid cognition and asks which the faculty could produce. Engaging what is to be taken up and cast aside is the work of cognition, not of matter; and the second result, the distinct knowing, tracks the distinctness of the cognitions bearing their objects’ aspects, which matter has no share in.

།གཟུང་བ་འཛིན་ཕྱིར་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ནི། །མི་འདོད་བློ་ནི་ཚད་མ་ཉིད། །བླང་དང་དོར་བྱའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡི། །འཇུག་ལ་དེ་གཙོ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་དང་།

།ཡུལ་རྣམ་ཅན་ནི་ཐ་དད་པས། །བློ་ཡི་རྟོགས་པ་ཐ་དད་ཕྱིར། །དེ་ཡོད་ན་འདི་ཡོད་ཕྱིར་རོ།

Because it apprehends what has [already] been apprehended, the conventional [cognition that perception induces] is not held [to be valid]. The mind [, not the material sense faculty, as the Vaibhāṣikas propose,] is valid cognition, because it is foremost in engaging things to be adopted and rejected, and because the mind’s realisations are distinct, since [cognitions] bearing the aspects of their objects are distinct; for when that [cognition] exists, this [knowing] exists [, and not from the sense faculty alone]. (pramanavartika II.3–4)

The second is at II.214, on ignorance. The Vaibhāṣika holds the view of the transitory collection to be a wrong conception while ignorance is merely the negation of knowing, so that the two are not the same (gorampa-pramanavartika, on PV II.213). Dharmakīrti’s reply makes ignorance an active mental factor:

།རིག་པའི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཕྱིར་དང་། །སེམས་བྱུང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། །ལོག་པར་དམིགས་ཉིད་མ་རིག་པར། །གསུངས་ཕྱིར་གཞན་ནི་རིགས་མ་ཡིན། །འགལ་བ་གང་ཡིན་འདིར་བཤད་བྱ།

Because it is opposed to awareness, and because it is a mental factor that observes [an object], ignorance is taught to be wrong observation [, not a mere absence of knowing, as some Vaibhāṣikas hold]; any other [account] is unreasonable. What is contradictory [to it] will be explained here. (pramanavartika II.214)

The argument is not a quibble about definitions. A mental factor is by nature concomitant with a primary consciousness and apprehends an object; ignorance and wisdom take the same object under contradictory aspects, so ignorance superimposes rather than merely failing (gorampa-pramanavartika, on PV II.214). What turns on it is whether the path has anything to remove. A mere absence of knowing is displaced by knowledge arriving; an active misapprehension has to be contradicted by its opposite, which is why the view of emptiness and not love or compassion is the antidote that uproots.

Chapter 3 carries the longest engagement, and the material for it is Gedun Drub’s commentary, which numbers no verses. The question is what a word expresses. The Vaibhāṣika answer is the non-associated dispositional factor “name-of-pot”: the sound “pot” expresses that, so the account does not leave the sense faculty objectless. Dharmakīrti’s fork asks whether the name is connected with the speaker and hearer, with the expressed pot, or with neither. On the first horn nobody would ever approach a pot on hearing “pot”, since only the name was expressed; and the escape route (that pot and pot-name resemble each other, so the cognition errs into the pot) fails because an error grounded in resemblance would sometimes go the other way, as with twins. The reply then turns the fault back: the Buddhist who says the word expresses the pot-image appearing in cognition does not incur it, because that expression produces a cognition manifesting the pot-aspect, whereas the Vaibhāṣika has no cognition manifesting the object-aspect at all, having refused aspects (Gedun Drub’s commentary on PV III). The refusal of aspects is doing the damage here, not the theory of names.

The same chapter uses the school as a reason for a doctrinal concession rather than a target. Asked why two aspects of consciousness are spoken of on the basis of external objects when there are none, Gedun Drub answers that the purpose is to lead the speakers of external object, the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, into the true meaning (same file). The two-aspect doctrine is pitched at where they already stand.

Sakya Paṇḍita

The chapter 1 refutation is short and does the most work of any passage here. It has two moves.

།ཆོད་པ་མིན་ཕྱིར་རྣམ་ཤེས་མིན། །དབང་པོ་རྟེན་བཅས་ལྟ་བྱེད་ལོ།

།བེམ་པོ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་ལྟ་བྱེད་མིན། །དུས་མཉམ་པ་ལ་འབྲེལ་པ་མེད།

“Since what is obstructed is not [seen], it is not consciousness [that sees]; the sense faculty serving as support is the seer”, so [the Vaibhāṣikas] say. [However,] being matter, it is not a seer; and between simultaneous things there is no relationship. (Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 1)

The first move is a flat denial: matter (བེམ་པོ་) has no capacity to apprehend anything, so the faculty does not see. The second is the one with reach. There are two relations only, the relation of identical nature (བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་) and the causal relation (དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་). A faculty and an object present at the same moment are distinct entities, so not the first; and being concurrent, neither can have produced the other, so not the second. Related by neither, they stand to one another as the eastern mountain to the western, and unrelated things cannot be seer and seen (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 1).

That argument does not depend on the faculty being matter, and Sakya Paṇḍita immediately spends it on someone else:

།ཡུལ་དང་རྣམ་ཤེས་དུས་མཉམ་ནི། །གཟུང་འཛིན་ཡིན་ཞེས་གངས་ཅན་པ།

།དུས་མཉམ་ཕྱིར་ན་འབྲེལ་པ་མེད། །རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལ་རྣམ་ཤེས་འགལ།

“Object and consciousness, being simultaneous, are apprehended and apprehender”, say those of the Land of Snow. Being simultaneous, they have no relationship; and consciousness without a cause opposes [reason]. (Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 1)

The early Tibetans had dropped the seeing faculty and kept the simultaneity, which Sodargye takes to be close enough to the Vaibhāṣika for the two to be refuted together (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 1). The translation notes name Cha-ba as the Tibetan for whom subject and object had to be simultaneous if cognition was to reach its object at all (translation notes to Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 1). They get an extra cost: if the object a cognition depends on is merely concurrent with it, the cognition has no cause. Their reply (the previous moment’s object is the cause, the simultaneous object is what is apprehended) concedes the argument, because once the cognition has arisen from the prior object the concurrent one has no work left to do. Sodargye draws the practical moral: seeing a pillar, do not think “this present pillar is my object”, because the object that produced this cognition ceased a moment ago.

Chapter 9 refuses the Vaibhāṣika account of valid cognition and result, which is one of four rival schemes the root text surveys before stating its own:

།ལྟ་དང་ངེས་པ་ཚད་འབྲས་དང༌། །ཕྲད་དང་དོན་རྟོགས་ཚད་འབྲས་འདོད། །ཁྱད་པར་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་དེར་སྨྲ། །ལ་ལ་དབང་ཤེས་ཚད་འབྲས་འདོད།

[Some—the Mīmāṃsakas—] hold seeing and ascertaining to be valid cognition and result; [some—the Naiyāyikas—] hold contact and cognizing the object; [some—the Vaiśeṣikas—] speak of the distinction and the distinction-bearer (ཁྱད་པར / ཁྱད་པར་ཅན); and some—[the Vaibhāṣikas]—hold the sense faculty and sense cognition to be valid cognition and result. (Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 9)

Only the first three schemes belong to non-Buddhists; the fourth is Buddhist, and it fails by the chapter 1 argument. The auto-commentary gives the reason in a sentence: a bare faculty has no nearer or further relation to the objects it is supposed to tell apart, and matter cannot know an object (auto-commentary on Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 9). On the Vaibhāṣika scheme the object of comprehension (གཞལ་བྱ་) is the real external object appearing when colour meets the faculty, the sense faculty is the valid cognition, and the mind cognising the object is the result, so object of comprehension and result are different substances existing at the same time, which makes cause and effect simultaneous and makes it unnecessary for the valid cognition to arise in dependence on its object at all (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 9). The school’s absence of self-awareness costs it here too. Sakya Paṇḍita’s next line says that most tenet systems agree on self-awareness as valid cognition and result; “most” is there to exclude the Vaibhāṣika, for whom the analysis cannot even be stated (same source).

Chapter 7 folds the school into a survey of accounts of how contradictories exclude one another. The root text lists three and rejects them together:

།ལ་ལ་ཉེ་བར་ཞི་བར་འདོད། །ཁ་ཅིག་ཕྲད་ནས་བསྒྱུར་བར་འདོད། །འགའ་ཞིག་ཕྲད་པ་མེད་པར་འདོད། །རྟག་སྨྲ་དེ་དག་འཁྲུལ་པ་ཡིན།

།ལྷན་ཅིག་གནས་ན་འགལ་བ་ཉམས། །བསྒྱུར་ན་རྟག་པར་འདོད་པ་འགལ།

Some [Sāṃkhya] hold that [the weaker] subsides into latency; some [Vaiśeṣika] hold that on contact it is transformed; some [Hearer schools] hold that there is no contact at all. These proponents of permanence are all mistaken. If they abide together, contradiction is lost; and if [one] is transformed [into the other], that contradicts their assertion of permanence. (Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 7)

The third position is the Buddhist one: fire and water atoms (རྡུལ་ཕྲན་) never touch, the stronger occupying the weaker’s place and blocking it from forming a coarse object. Calling its holders “proponents of permanence” alongside two non-Buddhist schools is deliberate. Sodargye’s gloss is that although the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika do not assert permanence outright, they hold the partless atom indestructible under analysis, which is the same commitment in a Buddhist idiom. The refutation is that on any of these accounts the two atoms persist together through several instants, and coexistence is exactly what a non-coexistence contradiction (འགལ་བ་) excludes (sodargye-pramanayuktanidhi, on chapter 7).

Two caveats on this passage. The root text names no school; it says “some” and, on the reading Sodargye follows, “Hearer schools”. So the identification of the third position as Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika is his, not Sakya Paṇḍita’s. And the sub-detail he supplies, that the Vaibhāṣika hold the atoms genuinely to touch whereas the Sautrāntika keep a gap held open by the nature of things, he draws from the Abhidharmakośa, not from the Pramāṇayuktanidhi.

What the debate turns on

Every argument above is the same argument in a different costume: whether a cause can still be there when its effect arrives. Grant that it can, and the Vaibhāṣika system is coherent and rather economical: the object is present to the cognition, so no aspect is needed to stand in for it, no reflexive awareness is needed to secure the connection, and perception can be exactly what it seems to be. Deny it, as strict momentariness (སྐད་ཅིག་མ་) requires, and the whole apparatus of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology becomes necessary: the aspect to carry a vanished object into the present, self-awareness to make the cognition available to itself, and the causal reading of the relation between object and cognition that lets the two be dated apart. This is why Sakya Paṇḍita spends his refutation of the Vaibhāṣika on the early Tibetans. The school is dead; the temptation it represents, to let a philosophy of momentary things be corrected by the intuition that we see what is in front of us, is not.

What the material leaves open. Dreyfus records a Vaibhāṣika who does not fit the pattern: Subhagupta (650–750 CE), a critic of Dharmakīrti usually classified in this school, who accepted that determinate perception has an aspect while holding that aspect false, a position Dreyfus suspects may lie behind Dharmottara’s departures from orthodoxy (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, p. 363). He does appear in the Pramāṇayuktanidhi tradition, though not in the root text. Sakya Paṇḍita’s auto-commentary on chapter 1 answers the objections Subhagupta raised in his Proof of External Objects (Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā) against the co-apprehension argument for mind-only, and Gorampa calls him a Vaibhāṣika master (auto-commentary and Gorampa on Pramāṇayuktanidhi chapter 1). The engagement is on idealism, not on the seeing faculty, and our material does not give its content. Nor do our texts argue against sarvāstitva, the doctrine the parent Sarvāstivāda is named for; the Vaibhāṣika they refute is a theory of perception with an ontology attached.

Graph View

Backlinks