Realism vs. Antirealism in Tibetan Epistemology

The central axis of disagreement in Tibetan epistemological thought, running through ontology, philosophy of language, and the theory of knowledge.

The Antirealist Position (Sa-gya)

Following dharmakirti and sakya-pandita:

• Only individuals (momentary, causally effective thing-events) are real
• Universals, commonsense objects, and all abstract properties are conceptual fictions
• The specifically-characterised is restricted to strict individuals with determinate spatio-temporal location
• momentariness is strict: duration is illusory
• Epistemology should not accommodate commonsense intuitions — they are products of ignorance
• The apoha (exclusion) theory of language explains how thought functions without real universals

The Moderate Realist Position (Ge-luk)

Following cha-ba’s innovations, codified by gyel-tsap, kay-drup, and Ge-dün-drup:

• Both individuals and universals have a degree of reality
• Universals are not separate from their instances but are real properties dependent on them
• Commonsense objects (jars, mountains) are real — not mere conceptual fictions
• The specifically-characterised is defined by causal effectiveness, not strict individuality
• momentariness means constant change, not instantaneous cessation — continua are real
• Epistemology should, as much as possible, respect commonsense intuitions
• A jar that lasts for seven years endures through a continuum of changes

Historical Background

The conflict has deep roots, going back to rival interpretations of Dharmakīrti in India. A “minority Buddhist interpretation” had already attenuated Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s antirealism toward moderate realism; cha-ba encountered and adopted this interpretation by “what may have been no more than a historical accident” (shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara-intro, p. 29).

The conflict crystallised in the 14th–15th centuries:

1. cha-ba (12th c.) introduced realist innovations into Tibetan epistemology
2. sakya-pandita (13th c.) attacked these in the Treasure, quoting Dharmakīrti directly rather than relying on commentaries. His dual purpose: propagate correct understanding and refute the flawed realist interpretations. The work was initially poorly received (sonam-introduction-treasury)
3. Yak-don (14th c.) revived the Treasure’s antirealist reading
4. gyel-tsap and kay-drup (15th c.) attempted to reinterpret the Treasure as compatible with realism
5. gorampa and sakya-chok-den (15th c.) wrote definitive Sa-gya rebuttals

The Suppression

The most strident critics of Tsongkhapa — Rongtön (1367–1449), Taktsang Lotsāwa (1405–?), gorampa, sakya-chok-den, and the 8th Karmapa Mikyö Dorje (1505–1557) — were silenced by ideological proscriptions at the beginning of the 17th century following the rise to political power of the Ge-luk school. Their writings “ceased to be available and were almost lost” — Gorampa’s works were only fully reassembled in the early 20th century, and Śākya Chokden’s were discovered in Bhutan and published as late as 1975 (shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara-intro, p. 12).

Dreyfus’s Assessment

Dreyfus argues that the Sa-gya reading is closer to Dharmakīrti’s original intent but that the Ge-luk reinterpretation addresses genuine philosophical difficulties in Dharmakīrti’s system — particularly the problem of grounding inference in an ontology that excludes universals (dreyfus-recognizing-reality, passim).

The Mīmāṃsā Contrast

The realism/antirealism debate within Tibetan epistemology has a precursor in the opposition between the Buddhist logico-epistemological school and Mīmāṃsā (westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti, pp. 267–268):

• Mīmāṃsā epistemic optimism: untrained awareness is broadly trustworthy; epistemic instruments are intrinsically authoritative; we are justified in believing that objects in general (universals, a permanent self, caste) are real as they appear
• Buddhist epistemic pessimism: untrained awareness is shot through with ignorance; objects in general are conceptual fictions; commonsense is corrupted by attachment to permanence

The Ge-luk moderate realist position can be seen as moving part of the way toward the Mīmāṃsā side on these questions, while the Sa-gya antirealist position preserves the full force of the Buddhist critique.

Sources

• dreyfus-recognizing-reality — the central theme of the entire book
• westerhoff-dignaga-dharmakirti — the Mīmāṃsā contrast and epistemic optimism vs. pessimism (pp. 261–270)
• shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara-intro — Indian origins of moderate realism, suppression of critics, Tsongkhapa’s paradoxical adoption of pramāṇa within Prāsaṅgika
• sonam-introduction-treasury — Sapan’s dual purpose, direct quotation method, Bodong Panchen’s nihilist accusation, Sapan’s identification of pramāṇa teachers’ ultimate tenets as Cittamātra