Pramāṇayuktanidhi — Chapter One: Examining Objects
Root verses by Sakya Paṇḍita (ས་སྐྱ་པཎྜི་ཏ་), translated from the Tibetan. The meaning follows Tenzin Jamtsho’s translation in Sa-paṇ’s Dialectics (2026); terms follow the glossary. The Tibetan is the Sakya Kabum text (ས་སྐྱ་བཀའ་འབུམ་, vol. ད). Rivals’ words are in double quotes and everything outside the quotes is Sakya Paṇḍita’s. Who is speaking is added in square brackets to the root’s own “if you say” (or “you may say”, where the answer refutes the claim) or “so they say”.
On the treatise as a whole, see Pramāṇayuktanidhi; for a lecture commentary on this chapter, see Khenpo Sodargye on chapter 1.
རྒྱ་གར་སྐད་དུ། པྲ་མཱ་ཎ་ཡུག་ཏ་ནི་དྷི། བོད་སྐད་དུ། ཚད་མ་རིགས་པའི་གཏེར།
In Sanskrit: Pramāṇayuktanidhi. In Tibetan: Treasury of Reasoning on Valid Cognition.1
འཕགས་པ་འཇམ་དཔལ་གཞོན་ནུར་གྱུར་པ་ལ་གུས་པས་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།
With respect I prostrate to the Ārya Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta.
།ཤེས་བྱ་ཐམས་ཅད་གཟིགས་པའི་སྤྱན་ཡངས་པ། །འགྲོ་ཀུན་དགེ་ལེགས་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཐུགས་རྗེ་ཅན། །བསམ་ཡས་ཕྲིན་ལས་མཛད་པའི་སྟོབས་མངའ་བ། །འཇམ་མགོན་བླ་མའི་ཞབས་ལ་མགོས་ཕྱག་འཚལ།
With vast eyes that see all objects of knowledge, with compassion that accomplishes the welfare of every being, and with the power to perform inconceivable enlightened activity: at the feet of the Guru Mañjunātha I bow my head.2
།བློ་གྲོས་སྤྱི་གཙུག་ཡོན་ཏན་ནོར་བུའི་རྒྱན་གྱིས་སྤྲས། །བདེན་གཉིས་རོ་འཛིན་སྟོང་ཉིད་ཕུད་སྒྲའི་སྒྲ་སྒྲོགས་ཤིང༌། །མཁྱེན་བརྩེའི་ལྟ་ཟེར་ཕས་རྒོལ་སྐྱེ་བོས་མི་བཟོད་པ། །བློ་གསལ་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་རྒྱན་གྱུར་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཀླུ་དབང་རྒྱལ།
The crown of your intellect adorned with the jewel ornaments of good qualities, your tongue uttering the two truths resounding the phuṭ of emptiness; your gaze of wisdom and compassion, like light rays, unbearable to opposing disputants: glorious Nāga Lord, ornament of the ocean of the clear-minded, be victorious!3
།གངས་རིའི་ཁྲོད་འདིར་མཁས་པའི་རྒྱུ་སྐར་བྱེ་བ་བརྒྱས། །དཔལ་ལྡན་གྲགས་པའི་གསུང་རབ་པདྨོ་ཁ་ཕྱེ་མོད། །གང་བློའི་ཉི་འོད་སྣང་བས་མ་ཁྱབ་དེ་སྲིད་དུ། །གཞུང་ལུགས་དགོངས་དོན་གེ་སར་སྙིང་པོ་གསལ་མ་ནུས།
Here among the snow mountains, hundreds of millions of star-like scholars have opened the lotus-like scriptures of the glorious [Dignāga and] Dharmakīrti; yet until the sunlight of my understanding spread over it, they could not bring to light its heart, the stamens: the intended meaning of the treatises.4
།ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པའི་བཞེད་གཞུང་ཇི་ལྟ་བར། །བློ་གྲོས་གསལ་བའི་མིག་གིས་ལེགས་མཐོང་ནས། །ཤེས་ལྡན་གཟུ་བོར་གནས་པ་དོན་གཉེར་བ། །གཞན་ལ་བརྩེ་བའི་བསམ་པས་འདི་བཤད་དོ།
Having seen well, with the eye of clear intelligence, the system of Dharmakīrti just as he held it, I shall explain this, with a loving mind, for others: the intelligent, the impartial, and those who strive for the meaning.
།ཡུལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་བློས་རིག་བྱ།
The definition of an object is: what is cognisable by the mind.5
།དོན་སྤྱི་དང་ནི་མེད་སྣང་གཉིས། །ཡུལ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན་དེ་འཛིན་གྱི། །ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་པོ་འཁྲུལ་པར་འགལ།
If you [early Tibetan logicians]6 say, “The two, the conceptual generality7 and the non-existent appearance, are objects”, then it is contradictory for the two cognitions that apprehend them to be mistaken.
།ཡུལ་ཡོད་ན་ཡང་ཐག་པ་ལ། །སྦྲུལ་འཛིན་བཞིན་དུ་འཁྲུལ་ཞེ་ན། །ཁྲར་འཛིན་ཡུལ་ཡོད་ཕྱིར་མ་འཁྲུལ། ཡུལ་མེད་པས་ན་སྦྲུལ་འཛིན་འཁྲུལ།
While you [Tibetan logicians] say, “Even when the object exists, [a cognition] can be mistaken, like the apprehension of a rope as a snake”, [actually] the apprehension of the mottled [rope] is non-mistaken, since its object exists, and the apprehension of a snake is mistaken because its object does not exist.
།སྣང་ཡུལ་གཉིས་པོ་ཤེས་པ་ལས། །ཐ་དད་ཡིན་ན་ཡུལ་རུང་བར། །གནས་པའི་གང་ཟག་གཞན་གྱིས་ཀྱང༌། །མཐོང་འགྱུར་བུམ་པ་ལ་སོགས་བཞིན།
If the two appearing objects were different from the cognitions, any other person standing within range would also see them, as with a vase and the like.
།དོན་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཡང་ལུས་ཀྱི་ནང༌། །མི་མཐོང་བཞིན་དུ་འཁྲུལ་སྣང་གཉིས། །བདག་ལ་རྟག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཞན་གྱི་རྟོགས་པ་མེད་ཅེ་ན།
You [Tibetan logicians] may say, “Though they are objects, the two mistaken appearances are like the inside of the body, which is not seen: because they are always related to oneself, others do not realise them”.
།ནང་གི་ལུས་ནི་ཡུལ་རུང་མིན། །དེས་ན་རང་གིས་ཀྱང་མི་མཐོང༌། །རང་དང་རྟག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་པས་ན། །གཉིས་པོའང་ཡུལ་རུང་མིན་ཞེ་ན། །རང་བློ་ཁོ་ན་དང་འབྲེལ་ཕྱིར། །བརྗོད་ཀྱང་གཞན་གྱིས་རྟོགས་མི་འགྱུར།
[However] the inside of the body is not a viable object, and that is why even oneself does not see it. If you say, “Since they are always related to oneself, the two are not viable objects either”, then, being related to one’s own mind alone, they will not be realised by others even when expressed.
།རང་རང་བློ་དང་འབྲེལ་པའི་ཕྱིར། །བརྗོད་པས་དེ་ཉིད་རྟོགས་ཤེ་ན། །གང་ཟག་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བརྗོད་བྱའི་དོན། །སོ་སོ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་སྦྱོར་མི་ནུས།
While you [Tibetan logicians] may say, “Since each is related to its own mind, that very thing is realised through expression”, they cannot be linked, since the two persons’ objects of expression are separate.
།གང་ཟག་སོ་སོ་ལ་ཡོད་པའི། །སེམས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་འདྲ་བས། །འདྲ་བ་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཞེན་པ་ལ། །ཐ་སྙད་སྦྱོར་ཕྱིར་མི་འགལ་ན།
You [Tibetan logicians] may say, “The two mental aspects in the separate persons are similar, and convention is applied to what is similar, conceived as one; so there is no contradiction”.
།རང་ལ་ཤར་ན་རང་ཡུལ་ཡིན། །མ་ཤར་ན་ནི་དེ་ཡུལ་མིན། །དེས་ན་ཐ་དད་གཟུང་བ་ལ། །གཅིག་ཏུ་འཛིན་པ་ག་ལ་སྲིད།
[However] if it appears to oneself, it is one’s own object; if it does not appear, it is not one’s object. So how could things apprehended as different possibly be apprehended as one?
།ཐ་དད་ཡིན་ཡང་ཡུལ་གཅིག་ཏུ། །འཁྲུལ་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་འཛིན་ཞེ་ན། །གཅིག་ཏུ་འཛིན་པ་འཁྲུལ་པའི་ཕྱིར། །གཟུང་ཡུལ་མེད་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན།
If you [Tibetan logicians] say, “Although they are different, they are apprehended as one object by way of mistake”, then, since apprehending them as one is mistaken, it is established that there is no apprehended object.
།རིགས་པས་བརྟགས་ན་མེད་བཞིན་དུ། །ད་དུང་ཕལ་ཆེར་ཡུལ་དུ་ཞེན། །སོར་མོའི་རྩེ་མོས་བསྟན་པ་ན། །ནམ་མཁའ་མཐོང་ཞེས་བླུན་པོ་འཁྲུལ། །བར་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པའོ།
Although they do not exist when examined by reasoning, most still conceive of them as objects, as when someone points with a fingertip and a fool, deluded, thinks they see the sky. This is an interstitial verse.
།གཞལ་བྱ་རང་མཚན་གཅིག་ཁོ་ན།
The object of comprehension is the specifically characterised phenomenon8 alone.
།ཡུལ་གཉིས་བཞེད་པས་གནོད་ཅེ་ན། །འཇུག་ཚུལ་སྒོ་ནས་རང་སྤྱི་གཉིས།
If you say, “This is undermined by [Dignāga’s] assertion of two objects”: specifically and generally characterised phenomena are two by way of the mode of engagement.9
།མེད་པའང་གཞལ་བྱར་མཚུངས་ཤེ་ན། །དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་གྱི་དགོས་ནུས་མེད། །སྐྲ་སོགས་སྣང་བ་བློ་ཉིད་ཡིན། །སྐྲར་སྣང་དོན་ལ་གྲུབ་པ་མེད། །དེ་ནི་དངོས་པོར་ཡོད་མེད་ཅེས། །རྟོག་པས་དཔྱོད་ན་སྤྱི་མཚན་ཡིན།
You may say, “Then the non-existent would equally be an object of comprehension”; [however,] it has neither the purpose nor the ability of an object. The appearance of [floating] hairs and the like is mind itself; what appears as hair is not established in reality. When conceptual cognition examines whether it exists as an entity or not, it is a generally characterised phenomenon10.
།དངོས་མེད་གཉིས་པོ་རང་རིག་གི །ཤུགས་ལ་གྲུབ་པས་བསལ་ཞེ་ན། །འཁྲུལ་ཤེས་གཉིས་ལ་ཡུལ་མེད་ཅིང༌། །རང་རིག་གིས་ནི་མྱོང་བའི་ཕྱིར། །ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་དེ་ཡང་ནི། །མེད་པ་འཛིན་ཕྱིར་འཁྲུལ་ཤེས་ཡིན།
You [Tibetan logicians]11 may say, “The two non-entities are established implicitly by self-awareness, so [your position] is overturned”; [however,] the two mistaken cognitions have no object, and since they are experienced by self-awareness, they are cognition itself; and since they apprehend the non-existent, they are mistaken cognitions.
།རང་མཚན་མིན་པའི་ཡུལ་མེད་ན། དངོས་མེད་གཞལ་བྱར་འགལ་ཞེ་ན། །དགག་བྱ་དངོས་པོར་ཡོད་མེད་ཅེས། །གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་འགལ་བ་མེད།
If you say, “If there is no object other than the specifically characterised, it is contradictory for non-entities to be objects of comprehension”, there is no contradiction, since [a non-entity] is established [by asking] whether the object of negation exists as an entity or not.
།ཕྱི་ཡི་གཟུང་ཡུལ་མཁས་པས་བཀག །ཤེས་པའི་གཟུང་ཡུལ་འདིར་མི་སྲིད། །དེས་ན་གཞལ་བྱ་གཅིག་ཉིད་ཀྱང༌། །མི་འཐད་ཅེས་ནི་འགའ་ཞིག་སྨྲ།
“The learned have refuted the external apprehended object, and an apprehended object that is cognition is not possible here; so not even the one object of comprehension is tenable”, some declare.12
།ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དང་དབང་ཕྱུག་དང༌། །གཙོ་བོ་རྡུལ་དང་རྣམ་རིག་དང༌། །རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་ཞེས་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ། །ཐ་དད་རང་གཞན་སྡེ་པ་འདོད།
That [the cause of things] is intrinsic nature, Īśvara, primal substance, atoms, cognisance or dependent arising: these are the different tenets held by schools of our own and others.13
།ཆོད་པ་མིན་ཕྱིར་རྣམ་ཤེས་མིན། །དབང་པོ་རྟེན་བཅས་ལྟ་བྱེད་ལོ། །བེམ་པོ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་ལྟ་བྱེད་མིན། །དུས་མཉམ་པ་ལ་འབྲེལ་པ་མེད།
“Since what is obstructed is not [seen], it is not consciousness [that sees]; the sense faculty serving as support is the seer”, so [the Vaibhāṣikas]14 say. [However,] being matter, it is not a seer; and between simultaneous things there is no relationship.
།ཡུལ་དང་རྣམ་ཤེས་དུས་མཉམ་ནི། །གཟུང་འཛིན་ཡིན་ཞེས་གངས་ཅན་པ། །དུས་མཉམ་ཕྱིར་ན་འབྲེལ་པ་མེད། །རྒྱུ་མེད་པ་ལ་རྣམ་ཤེས་འགལ། །སྐད་ཅིག་སྔ་མའི་ཡུལ་རྒྱུ་ཡིན། །དུས་མཉམ་གཟུང་ཡུལ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། །ཡུལ་ལས་སྐྱེས་ཕྱིར་རྣམ་ཤེས་གྲུབ། །དེ་ལ་དུས་མཉམ་དགོས་པ་མེད།
“Object and consciousness, being simultaneous, are apprehended and apprehender”, say those of the Land of Snow.15 Being simultaneous, they have no relationship; and consciousness without a cause opposes [reason]. You may say, “The object of the previous moment is the cause, and the simultaneous one is the apprehended object”, [yet] consciousness is established because it arose from the object, and for that nothing simultaneous is needed.
།ཡུལ་དང་དབང་པོ་ཡིད་ལ་བྱེད། །དེ་ལས་སྐྱེས་པ་རྣམ་ཤེས་ཡིན། །ཟས་སོགས་བུ་ཡི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ཡང༌། །ཕ་མའི་གཟུགས་བཞིན་ཡུལ་འདྲར་སྐྱེ། །དེས་ན་ཡུལ་ལ་འབྲས་བུ་གཉིས། །བློ་ཡང་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཡིན་པར་འདོད།
That which arises from object, sense faculty and mental engagement16 is consciousness.17 Although food and the like are causes of a child, it is born resembling its parents’ form; [so too consciousness] arises resembling its object. Hence the object has two results, and the mind too is held to have two aspects.
།གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་བྲལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། །དོན་མེད་དེས་ན་རྣམ་པའང་མེད།
Being neither one nor many, [external] objects do not exist, and so neither do [their] aspects.18
།ཀུན་རྫོབ་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྲགས་པ་ལ། །བརྟེན་ན་ཚད་མའི་རྣམ་གཞག་འགལ།
If, for the relative, one relies on the common renown of the world, the system of valid cognition falls into contradiction.19
།གསལ་དང་ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་པས་འགྲུབ། །ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ལ་གཞན་མི་སྲིད། །རྫས་གཞན་ཡིན་ན་རྟགས་མི་སྲིད། །ཟླ་གཉིས་སྣང་བཞིན་སྔོ་འཛིན་ཡང༌། །གཞན་ལ་མཐའ་གཞན་བཀག་པས་ཁེགས།
[That all knowables are mind] is established by clarity and by co-apprehension20. For what is co-apprehended, being other is impossible; were they different substances, the reason would be impossible. As with the appearance of two moons, so too with blue and its apprehender. [The reason] is excluded from what is other, since the alternatives are negated.21
།སེམས་རྒྱུན་ཡན་ལག་ཅན་དང་མཚུངས། །སྐད་ཅིག་རྡུལ་གྱི་ཆ་ཤས་བཞིན། །དེས་ན་སྐད་ཅིག་གསུམ་བདག་ཕྱིར། །གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་བྲལ་ཞེས་ཟེར། །སྐད་ཅིག་གསུམ་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ཕྱིར། །སྐད་ཅིག་གཅིག་པ་མི་སྲིད་འགྱུར། །སྐད་ཅིག་པ་གཅིག་མི་སྲིད་ན། །གསུམ་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་ཉམས།
“The mental continuum is like a whole22, and its moments are like the parts of an atom; so, since [a moment] has the nature of three moments, it is neither one nor many”, so [the Mādhyamikas]23 say. If it has the nature of three moments, a single moment becomes impossible; and if a single moment is impossible, having the nature of three is lost.
།རགས་པ་ཅིག་ཆར་བསྐོར་བས་ན། །དབུས་ཀྱི་རྡུལ་ཕྲན་ཆ་བཅས་འགྱུར། །དུས་གསུམ་ཅིག་ཆར་མི་སྐྱེ་བས། །ད་ལྟའི་སྐད་ཅིག་ཆ་མེད་ཡིན།
In a coarse [object], because [the atoms] surround it all at once, the central atom comes to have parts; but since the three times do not arise all at once, the present moment is partless.
།དོན་དུ་སྣང་བ་བློ་ཉིད་ཡིན། །སྣང་བ་དེ་ཉིད་ཕྱི་ན་མེད། །བག་ཆགས་བརྟན་དང་མི་བརྟན་ལས། །བདེན་དང་རྫུན་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་བྱེད།
What appears as an object is mind itself; that very appearance does not exist outside. True and false are presented on the basis of stable and unstable traces24.25
།ཇི་སྲིད་ཕྱི་རོལ་ཁས་ལེན་པ། །དེ་སྲིད་རྒྱུ་ལ་གཟུང་ཡུལ་ཟེར། །ཤེས་བྱ་ནང་གིར་ཞུགས་པ་ན། །ཡུལ་དང་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྲུབ་པ་མེད། །བསྡུ་བའི་ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པ་འོ།
So long as external [objects] are accepted, the cause is called the apprehended object; once objects of knowledge are drawn inward, object and subject are not established. This is a summary verse.26
།ཚད་མ་རིགས་པའི་གཏེར་ལས་ཡུལ་བརྟག་པའི་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ་དང་པོའོ།།
From the Treasury of Reasoning on Valid Cognition, the first chapter: the examination of objects.
Footnotes
-
Jamtsho’s critical edition gives the Sanskrit as Pramāṇayuktinidhi; the transliteration in the Tibetan reads -yukta-. ↩
-
The auto-commentary does not comment on the four opening verses. The exegetical tradition takes the guru to be Sakya Paṇḍita’s uncle and teacher Drakpa Gyaltsen (གྲགས་པ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་), and Sangye Pal’s commentary says so explicitly. ↩
-
Jamtsho reads this as homage to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the founders of Buddhist epistemology, praised through the figure of the Nāga king: his jewelled crown is their intellect set with qualities, the phuṭ of his tongue their teaching of the two truths and emptiness, his unbearable gaze their wisdom and compassion, and his place as ornament of the ocean their place among the learned. ↩
-
དཔལ་ལྡན་གྲགས་པ་: Jamtsho reads “the Glorious One [Dignāga] and Dharmakīrti”. Sakya Paṇḍita names none of the star-like scholars. Ngawang Chodrak identifies them as Ngok Lotsawa, Cha-ba Chökyi Sengge and Tsangnakpa Tsöndrü Sengge; Uyukpa Rigpé Sengge, the earliest commentator, as the early translators Kawa Paltsek and Chokro Lü’i Gyaltsen. ↩
-
Rongtön Sheja Kunrig reads བློ་ here as valid cognition: whatever is an object is established by valid cognition. ↩
-
The opponents in this exchange are the early Tibetan logicians, notably Cha-ba, who held the conceptual generality and the non-existent appearance (hairs seen with an eye disease, a double moon) to be real apprehended objects (Sodargye). Sakya Paṇḍita attributes a similar view to the Hearer (Śrāvaka) schools, and Gorampa traces the Tibetan idea back to Dharmottara. Jamtsho thinks the arguments are most likely aimed at Tsurtön Zhönnu Sengge, whose commentary carries the same threefold list. ↩
-
Sanskrit arthasāmānya. ↩
-
Sanskrit: object of comprehension, prameya; specifically characterised phenomenon, svalakṣaṇa. ↩
-
Dignāga’s twofold division is made by the mode of apprehension: non-conceptual cognition apprehends only the specifically characterised phenomenon, conceptual cognition the generally characterised (Sodargye). ↩
-
Sanskrit sāmānyalakṣaṇa. ↩
-
Sodargye identifies these objectors as the early Tibetan logicians. ↩
-
The commentaries do not name these scholars. The objection runs two systems together: the apprehended object belongs to the Sautrāntika account, where external objects are granted, and its denial to the Chittamatra account. The summary verse that closes the chapter gives the answer. ↩
-
Sodargye identifies the schools: intrinsic nature, the Charvakas; Īśvara, the followers of Maheśvara; primal substance, the Sāṃkhyas; atoms, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhist Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas; cognisance, Chittamatra; dependent arising, Madhyamaka. ↩
-
Their argument: consciousness is immaterial and so cannot be obstructed; if it were the seer, one would see through walls. Since obstruction blocks sight, the material faculty must be what sees (Sodargye). Jamtsho traces the view to Abhidharmakośa I.42ab. In the auto-commentary’s outline, this verse and the next refute other views before the Sautrāntika position is stated. ↩
-
The early Tibetan logicians. Sodargye notes that they drop the Vaibhāṣika claim that the faculty sees but keep the simultaneity of object and cognition. Jamtsho names Cha-ba, for whom subject and object must be simultaneous if cognition is to reach its object at all. ↩
-
Sanskrit manaskāra. ↩
-
Sakya Paṇḍita here states his own position within the Sautrāntika system, which he calls the system of the object knower (དོན་རིག་). Sodargye explains the object’s “two results” as the continuation of its own kind and the cognition that bears its form. The mind’s “two aspects” are, in the auto-commentary, the cognition that knows the object and the self-awareness that knows that cognition; Gorampa takes them as the objective aspect and the subjective aspect. ↩
-
With this verse Sakya Paṇḍita moves from the Sautrāntika to the Chittamatra system. In the Entrance Gate for the Wise (མཁས་པ་རྣམས་འཇུག་པའི་སྒོ་) he warns that reading “neither one nor many” here as a Madhyamaka argument mistakes the context: here it is a Chittamatra reasoning. ↩
-
Neither Sakya Paṇḍita nor his commentators name the target. Sodargye describes early logicians who proposed settling conventions in Candrakīrti’s Prāsaṅgika way, accepting what the world accepts without analysis. Jamtsho points to Cha-ba’s remark that double moons and conceptual generalities “abide as they are renowned in the world” as the kind of view under attack. ↩
-
Sanskrit sahopalambha. ↩
-
The auto-commentary gives two separate proofs that all knowables are mind. Clarity: the defining characteristic of cognition is to be clear and aware, and nothing knowable lacks it, so everything knowable is established as mind, just as a hump and dewlap establish a cow. Co-apprehension: whatever is invariably apprehended together (ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་; the root drops ངེས་) is not different, like the appearance of two moons, and blue and the cognition that apprehends it are invariably apprehended together. སྔོ་འཛིན་ is therefore the pair “blue and its apprehender”, not “the apprehension of blue”. The auto-commentary calls this an observation of something contradictory to the pervader: being different is pervaded by being different substances at different times, and invariable co-apprehension contradicts that. The last line gives the negative pervasion (ལྡོག་ཁྱབ་), that co-apprehension never occurs in the dissimilar class (མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་) of different things. The auto-commentary takes the alternatives in turn. Different things at different times are apprehended at different times, so they are not co-apprehended. A superimposition at the same time is known to be a superimposition, so its object is nothing other than the cognition. Different substances at the same time are ruled out by an invalidating reason (གནོད་པ་ཅན་གྱི་རྟགས་): what is unrelated is not invariably apprehended together, like blue and yellow. Jamyang Loter Wangpo’s commentary (tr. Roger Espel Llima) reads the last line differently, as a quoted counterargument, “different [things] have different scopes”, which refutes being substantially different on two grounds: different entities are apprehended separately and at different times, and an invalidating reason applies to simultaneous ones. The substance matches the auto-commentary; the two part over whether མཐའ་གཞན་ means “the alternatives” or “different scopes”. ↩
-
Sanskrit avayavin. ↩
-
The Mādhyamika turns the “neither one nor many” reasoning back on the idealist’s partless moment of cognition. Sodargye notes that Sakya Paṇḍita answers while provisionally standing within the Chittamatra position. The next verse completes the reply: atoms are surrounded by other atoms at the same time, but the three times never arise together. ↩
-
Sanskrit vāsanā. ↩
-
Sakya Paṇḍita’s answer to how idealism can tell true from false without external objects: what most beings perceive through stable, enduring traces counts conventionally as correct, and what is perceived through unstable, temporary traces as incorrect, as with one moon and two (Sodargye). ↩
-
This answers the objection “some declare” above. As Gorampa’s verse closing the chapter puts it, external apprehended objects belong to the Sautrāntika system, and the proponents of cognition-only have no account of apprehended objects. Sodargye ranks the positions: Sautrāntika as less definitive, Chittamatra as provisionally definitive, Madhyamaka as fully definitive. ↩