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Pramāṇayuktanidhi, Chapter 2: Examining Cognition

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Pramāṇayuktanidhi — Chapter Two: Examining Cognition

Root verses by Sakya Paṇḍita (ས་སྐྱ་པཎྜི་ཏ་), translated from the Tibetan. The meaning follows Tenzin Jamtsho’s translation in Sa-paṇ’s Dialectics (2026); terms follow the glossary. The Tibetan is the Sakya Kabum text (ས་སྐྱ་བཀའ་འབུམ་, vol. ད). Rivals’ words are in double quotes and everything outside the quotes is Sakya Paṇḍita’s. Who is speaking is added in square brackets to the root’s own “if you say” (or “you may say”, where the answer refutes the claim) or “so they say”.

On the treatise as a whole, see Pramāṇayuktanidhi; for a lecture commentary on this chapter, see Khenpo Sodargye on chapter 2.

༈།བློ་ཡི་མཚན་ཉིད་རིག་པ་ཡིན།

The definition of mind1 is awareness.2

།ཡུལ་སོགས་སྒོ་ནས་དུ་མར་འགྱུར། །ཤེས་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་རང་རིག་གཅིག

By way of object and so forth, it becomes many; by way of cognition, it is one self-awareness3.4

།ཡིད་དཔྱོད་སྣང་ལ་མ་ངེས་དང༌། །བཅད་ཤེས་ལོག་ཤེས་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ལྔ།

[The early Tibetan logicians hold:]5 “Correct assumption6, appearance-without-ascertainment, subsequent cognition, wrong cognition and doubt are the five [invalid cognitions].”

།ཡིད་དཔྱོད་རྟགས་ལ་གཏན་མི་ལྟོས། །དམ་བཅའ་ཙམ་ཡིན་ཐེ་ཚོམ་འགྱུར། །རྟགས་ལ་ལྟོས་ན་ཡང་དག་གམ། །ལྟར་སྣང་གསུམ་ལས་འདའ་བ་མེད།

If correct assumption does not depend on a reason at all, it is a mere thesis and becomes doubt. If it depends on a reason, it does not go beyond a valid [reason] or the three invalid ones.7

།རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་གྱི་ཡིད་དཔྱོད་གཉིས། །ལྟར་སྣང་གསུམ་དུ་མི་འདུ་ན། །གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྣང་བཞི་པར་འགྱུར། །ཡིད་དཔྱོད་ལྟར་སྣང་མ་ཡིན་ན། །ཚད་མ་གསུམ་པ་སྲིད་པར་འགྱུར། །བདེན་པ་ངེས་ཀྱང་ཚད་མིན་ན། །རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའང་མིན་པར་འགྱུར། །དེས་ཀྱང་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་མི་གཅོད་ན། །གནོད་བྱ་གནོད་བྱེད་མིན་པར་འགྱུར། །ངེས་པ་མེད་ཀྱང་བདེན་བརྫུན་དང༌། །སོམ་ཉིའི་བློ་གསུམ་མི་འགལ་ན། །ངེས་པ་མེད་ན་ཡིད་དཔྱོད་ཉམས། །གཉིས་སུ་འགྱུར་ན་ཐེ་ཚོམ་དཀའ།

If the two [kinds of] correct assumption that have a reason are not included in the three invalid [reasons], there would be a fourth invalid reason. If correct assumption is not [among the] invalid [reasons], a third valid cognition8 would be possible. If it is not valid cognition even though it ascertains the truth, then inference too would not be [valid cognition]. If, though it ascertains,9 it does not cut off superimposition, then [superimposition and certainty] would not be the refuted and the refuter. If you [Tibetan logicians]10 say, “Even without ascertainment, the three minds that are true, false and wavering are not contradictory”, then without ascertainment correct assumption is lost, and if [the wavering] becomes two, doubt is hard [to maintain as a separate category].

།ཡང་ན་བདེན་པའི་ཡིད་དཔྱོད་ལྟར། །ལོག་པའི་ཡིད་དཔྱོད་ཅིས་མི་འཐད། །འདོད་ན་ཡིད་དཔྱོད་བདེན་པ་ཉམས། །མིན་ན་སྔ་མའང་མིན་པར་མཚུངས། །གཉིས་ཀར་དོགས་ན་ཐེ་ཚོམ་འགྱུར། །གལ་ཏེ་སྲིད་ན་གྲངས་ངེས་འཇིག །ལོག་ཤེས་ཡིན་ན་ཡིད་དཔྱོད་ཀྱང༌། །ཚད་མ་ཉིད་འགྱུར་མཚུངས་ཕྱིར་རོ།

Or else: just as there is true correct assumption, why should wrong correct assumption not be tenable? If you accept it, correct assumption’s being true is lost; if not, the former is equally untenable. If it suspects both [alternatives], it becomes doubt. If it does exist, the definitive enumeration collapses. If it is wrong cognition, correct assumption too would be valid cognition, since the two are parallel.11

།གལ་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་མཚན་མེད་པ་ཡི། །ཡིད་དཔྱོད་བདེན་ན་ཀུན་བདེན་འགྱུར།

If correct assumption without a reason is true, everything would be true.12

།གལ་ཏེ་ལོག་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན། །ཡིད་དཔྱོད་ཡིན་ན་གཞུང་དང་འགལ།

If what has a wrong reason is correct assumption, this contradicts the treatises.13

།རང་གཞན་སྡེ་པའི་ལུང་ལས་རྟོགས། །བློ་རིགས་བཞིར་འདུས་ཡིད་དཔྱོད་མིན།

What is realised from the scriptures of our own and others’ schools is included in the four classes of mind; it is not correct assumption.14

།གལ་ཏེ་སྣང་ལ་མ་ངེས་པ། །ཚད་མ་མིན་ན་མངོན་སུམ་ཀུན། །ཚད་མར་མིན་འགྱུར་མངོན་སུམ་ལ། །ངེས་པ་ཉིད་ནི་བཀག་ཕྱིར་རོ།

If appearance-without-ascertainment is not valid cognition, then all direct perception would fail to be valid cognition, since ascertainment itself has been ruled out for direct perception.15

།བཅད་ཤེས་རིགས་པས་མཐའ་བཅད་ན། །མ་རྟོགས་པ་དང་ལོག་རྟོག་དང༌། །ཡང་ན་ཚད་མ་ཉིད་འགྱུར་གྱི། །དེ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་བློ་མི་སྲིད།

If subsequent cognition is settled by reasoning, it becomes non-realisation, wrong conception, or else valid cognition itself; a mind other than these is not possible.16

།མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་བྲལ་ད་ལྟར་བ། །བཅད་ཤེས་འདས་པ་དྲན་པ་ཡིན། །ཡུལ་དུས་འཛིན་སྟངས་འགལ་བ་ལ། །གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ནི་ག་ལ་སྲིད།

Direct perception is free from conceptual construction and [apprehends] in the present; subsequent cognition is memory of the past. Where object, time and mode of apprehension are contradictory, how could there be a common locus?17

།རིགས་རྒྱུན་འཛིན་པ་མངོན་སུམ་སྟེ། རྗེས་ཤེས་བཅད་ཤེས་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། །རིགས་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན། །མཐོང་བའི་དོན་ལ་རྗེས་ཤེས་མེད།

You [Tibetan logicians]18 may say, “The apprehension of the continuum of similar type19 is direct perception, and the ensuing cognition is subsequent cognition”; [however,] a class is not an object of direct perception, and regarding an object seen there is no ensuing cognition.

།འགལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་ན་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད། །མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་དྲན་པ་མིན། །རིགས་ནི་དབང་པོའི་ཡུལ་དུ་འགལ། །མཐོང་བ་སྔ་ཕྱི་ཁྱད་པར་མེད། །ངེས་པ་ཡོད་ན་མངོན་སུམ་མིན། །འདྲ་བར་འཛིན་པ་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན། །དེས་ན་མངོན་སུམ་བཅད་ཤེས་དང༌། །གཞི་མཐུན་རིགས་པ་ཤེས་པས་བཀག །ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བསྡུ་བའི་ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པའོ།།

Because they are contradictory, there is no common locus. Because it is direct perception, it is not memory. A class is contradictory as the object of a sense faculty. Between earlier and later seeing there is no difference.20 If there is ascertainment, it is not direct perception. Apprehending [things] as similar is conceptual cognition. Therefore those who know reasoning have refuted a common locus of direct perception and subsequent cognition. This is a summary verse.

།།ཡུལ་དང་དབང་པོའི་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ། །ཚོགས་པའི་སྐད་ཅིག་ཇི་སྙེད་ཀྱིས། །མྱོང་བའི་རྣམ་ཤེས་གང་བསྐྱེད་པ། །སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བོའི་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན།

The experiencing [sense] consciousness produced by however many moments of the gathering of the subtle atoms of object and sense faculty: that is the direct perception of ordinary beings.21

།གྲངས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བསྡུ་ཇི་སྙེད་པ། །རིགས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བས་བྱས་པ་ཡིན། །ནང་གི་དབྱེ་བསྡུ་ཇི་སྙེད་པ། །དེ་ཡི་ཁོངས་སུ་གཏོགས་པར་བཞེད། །བར་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པའོ།།

However many divisions and groupings by number there are, they are made by division into classes; however many internal divisions and groupings there are, they are held to fall within those [classes].22 This is an interstitial verse.

།།མི་བསླུ་མ་གྲུབ་ཚད་མ་མིན།

What is not established as non-deceptive is invalid cognition.23

།མ་རྟོགས་ལོག་རྟོག་ཐེ་ཚོམ་སྟེ། །ཚད་མའི་འགལ་ཟླ་རྣམ་པ་གསུམ། །འཇུག་ཚུལ་སྒོ་ནས་ཕྱེ་བ་ཡིན། །ངོ་བོའི་སྒོ་ནས་བསྡུ་ན་གཅིག

Non-realisation, wrong conception and doubt are the three opposites of valid cognition. They are divided by way of the mode of engagement; gathered by way of their nature, they are one.24

།དེ་དང་དེ་མིན་འཛིན་པས་སྟོང༌། །མ་རྟོགས་པ་ཡིན་དབྱེ་ན་གསུམ། །མ་ཞུགས་པ་དང་མ་རྫོགས་དང༌། །རྫོགས་པར་གྱུར་ཀྱང་མ་རྙེད་པའོ།

What is empty of apprehending [its object] as that or as not that is non-realisation. Divided, it is threefold: not engaged, not completed, and completed yet not found.25

།དེ་འཛིན་པ་ལ་དེ་མིན་གྱིས། །གནོད་པ་ལོག་ཤེས་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས། །རྟོག་པ་དང་ནི་རྟོག་མེད་དེ། །སོ་སོར་ཕྱེ་ན་རྣམ་པ་ལྔ།

What apprehends [its object] as that, and is refuted by [the apprehension of it as] not that, is wrong cognition. Divided, it is twofold, conceptual and non-conceptual; divided separately, it is fivefold.26

།དེ་འཛིན་ན་ཡང་དེ་མིན་སྲིད། །ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཉིད་ཡིན་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས། །མངོན་དུ་གྱུར་དང་བག་ལ་ཉལ། །ཆ་མཉམ་པ་དང་ཤས་ཆེར་འཛིན།

What apprehends [its object] as that, while [admitting] the possibility of it being otherwise, is doubt. Divided, it is twofold: manifest and dormant; [as well as] evenly balanced and apprehending [one side] more predominantly.27

།ཚད་མའི་ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་པོ་ཡང༌། །རང་རིག་ཚད་མ་ཁོ་ནར་འདུས། །ཚད་མ་མིན་པ་གསུམ་པོ་ཡང༌། །མ་རྟོགས་པ་ལས་དོན་གཞན་མིན། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བསྡུ་བའི་ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པའོ།

The two valid cognitions are included in self-awareness valid cognition alone; so too, the three invalid cognitions are nothing other than non-realisation.28 This is a summary verse.

།ཚད་མ་རིགས་པའི་གཏེར་ལས་བློ་བརྟག་པའི་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ་གཉིས་པའོ།།

From the Treasury of Reasoning on Valid Cognition29, the second chapter: the examination of mind.

Footnotes

  1. Sanskrit buddhi. ↩

  2. The auto-commentary rejects the definition of mind as what knows an object. Chapter 1 defined the object as what is cognisable by the mind, so each would depend on the other and neither could be identified; and self-awareness, which has no object other than itself, would not count as cognition. Lowo Khenchen names Tsangnakpa and others as holding that definition. ↩

  3. Sanskrit svasaṃvedana; the glossary gives svasaṃvitti first. ↩

  4. The auto-commentary spells out “and so forth”: by object, mind is conceptual or non-conceptual; by the nature of cognition, mistaken or non-mistaken; by mode of engagement, as with cutting wood, it has not engaged its object, is engaging it, or has engaged it. Gathered from the side of the subject, all of these are included in self-awareness. ↩

  5. The auto-commentary names them “most Tibetan scholars, Cha-ba and others”; Sodargye adds Tsangnakpa. Lowo Khenchen traces the wording of the opponents’ definitions in this chapter to Tsurtön Zhönnu Sengge’s Lamp of Wisdom on Valid Cognition (ཚད་མ་ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲོན་མེ་). Sakya Paṇḍita accepts the last two of the five and refutes the first three. ↩

  6. Sanskrit manaḥparīkṣa. ↩

  7. The opponents define correct assumption as an awareness that, without depending on a reason, ascertains a previously unrealised concealed object in accordance with the fact. They divide it into three: without a reason (thinking there is water in one’s forefathers’ old well); with an inverted reason (concluding there is fire from the flies gathered round the smell of burnt meat); and with an unascertained reason (realising that sound is impermanent from the reason ‘produced’ without knowing the three-fold criteria) (auto-commentary). The “two [kinds] that have a reason” below are the second and third. ↩

  8. Sanskrit pramāṇa. ↩

  9. The Kabum text reads དེས་ཀྱང་ (“even by that”). Jamtsho’s critical edition reads ངེས་ཀྱང་ (“though it ascertains”), as does the auto-commentary, and the translation follows it. The auto-commentary cites the Pramāṇavārttika: with regard to one object, the two minds of certainty and superimposition are by nature refuted and refuter. ↩

  10. Sodargye identifies the speakers as the earlier Tibetan tradition. Their example in the auto-commentary: thinking ‘Is there water in the well?’ is correct assumption, thinking ‘Is there none?’ is wrong cognition, and holding both is doubt. The reply: if the one wavering is split between correct assumption and wrong cognition, no doubt can be found. ↩

  11. Wrong correct assumption would ascertain a concealed object not in accordance with the fact. If it is admitted, it is a sixth invalid cognition, and the five are no longer a definitive enumeration (auto-commentary). ↩

  12. The auto-commentary: then every conjecture, such as guessing that there is a treasure of jewels under one’s house, would be true. Nor is the old well a case without a reason: having once seen water there serves as one, and since that reason is uncertain, [the cognition] is doubt. Sodargye reports Gorampa making the same point. ↩

  13. On this view every uncertain reason (proving sound impermanent because it is audible, or because it is an object of comprehension) would yield correct assumption, yet the master classes such cognitions as doubt; and so would every non-established reason (sound is impermanent because it is visible), yet the treatises say a non-established reason produces no realisation (auto-commentary). ↩

  14. This answers the view that the wisdom arising from hearing scripture is correct assumption. In the auto-commentary, scripture backed by proof, such as the teaching of the four truths and the two kinds of selflessness, gives valid cognition; scripture with a refuter, such as the claim that bathing and austerities cleanse wrongdoing, gives wrong cognition; scripture with neither proof nor refuter gives doubt where its basis is established and non-realisation where it is not. ↩

  15. The opponents define appearance-without-ascertainment as the appearing of a specifically characterised object, such as blue, that does not contradict the superimposition ‘not blue’; their three kinds are where the object’s aspect is unclear, where the mind is not directed to it, and where a cause of error intervenes (auto-commentary). Sakya Paṇḍita’s point, supported in the auto-commentary by a commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika, is that direct perception never holds its object by ascertaining it, only by its appearing. ↩

  16. The auto-commentary: subsequent cognition is non-realisation, since the object of valid cognition ceases moment by moment and, even had it not, the mind has already realised it. Taking what is realised now to be the very thing realised before is wrong cognition, since it holds as that what is not that. Inferring past experience from present memory is the Yogācāras’ proof of the result. ↩

  17. The target is the opponents’ “perceptual subsequent cognition”, such as seeing the same blue just after seeing blue (auto-commentary). The auto-commentary sets out the contrast: direct perception is free from conceptual construction in nature, has the specifically characterised as its object and the present as its time, and apprehends clearly and unmixed; subsequent cognition is conceptual, has the word-object as its object and the past as its time, and apprehends unclearly and mixed. Answering a later objection by the Karmapa Chödrak Gyatso, Sodargye notes that the analysis of objects here stands on the Sautrāntika position. ↩

  18. Sodargye identifies the speakers as the earlier Tibetan tradition. The auto-commentary asks what the class is: a string of moments of blue, which is a substance and not a class; the universal of the non-Buddhists, which is impossible; or an elimination of other, which is superimposed and not an entity. None of these is an object of the senses. It takes the ensuing cognition to be certainty or memory, both conceptual. ↩

  19. Sanskrit jātisantāna. ↩

  20. The first blue and the later blue are alike in being a previously unseen specifically characterised object seen by an unmistaken cognition, so either both are valid cognition or neither is (auto-commentary). ↩

  21. This answers the objection that if direct perception is confined to the substance of a single moment, ordinary beings could have no valid direct perception (auto-commentary). Their direct perception does not engage individual atoms: it is the consciousness produced over however many moments by an object made of gathered atoms, a sense faculty, mental engagement and so on. ↩

  22. Aimed at the fivefold list. Setting up separate classes of mind on the strength of some minor feature would undo every definitive enumeration in Dharmakīrti’s system, of valid and invalid cognition and of invalid reasons, as if adventitious inference were not included in inference (auto-commentary). ↩

  23. The auto-commentary defends the negative form: just as ‘not an ox’ is marked out by ruling out the hump and dewlap, there is no fault in defining it this way. ↩

  24. Sakya Paṇḍita’s own position. The auto-commentary matches the three to the three faults of a reason: a non-established reason has no power to produce realisation, and non-realisation engages neither rightly nor wrongly; an uncertain reason produces wavering, as doubt does; a contradictory reason proves the unwanted, as wrong conception realises what is not so. Stated reasons are only four, one of them faultless, and in the same way a mind’s modes of engagement are only four, one of them valid; so invalid cognition is definitively three. By nature, wrong conception and doubt are themselves non-realisation. ↩

  25. The auto-commentary’s examples: not engaged, as with one who knows no logic and has never turned to the three-fold criteria; not completed, as with one who, asked whether sound is permanent, has begun to examine it; completed yet not found, in three ways: where there is no object to realise, as with subsequent cognition; where the realising mind is corrupted, as with momentariness, not realised from the side of elimination of other; and where it is not an object of knowledge, as with things remote in place, time or nature. ↩

  26. The five (auto-commentary). Non-conceptual: a corrupted sense consciousness, as when seeing two moons, and a corrupted mental consciousness, as in a dream. Conceptual: error about aspect, as with a rope taken for a snake; about time, as when thinking the present blue is the past blue, which is what gets counted as subsequent cognition; and about the object, as when thinking this śiṃśapā and sandalwood share one universal. ↩

  27. Manifest doubt is actually engaged, as when wondering whether a fire offering wins a higher rebirth or not; dormant doubt is like a seed in a box, with potency once it meets conditions. The auto-commentary places under it every uncertain reason and correct assumption: in short, a mind that engages a concealed object without depending on a reason is, on examination, doubt, whether its content is true or false. Sodargye takes the second pair as a division of manifest doubt. ↩

  28. Under the enumeration verse above, the auto-commentary says that both valid cognitions are included in self-awareness direct perception, just as both objects are included in the specifically characterised object of comprehension. Śākya Chokden gives the reason: the direct object of comprehension of both valid cognitions is cognition itself. ↩

  29. Sanskrit title: Pramāṇayuktanidhi. ↩

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