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Pramāṇayuktanidhi, Chapter 3: Examining Universals and Particulars

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Pramāṇayuktanidhi — Chapter Three: Examining Universals and Particulars

Root verses by Sakya Paṇḍita (ས་སྐྱ་པཎྜི་ཏ་), translated from the Tibetan. The meaning follows Tenzin Jamtsho’s translation in Sa-paṇ’s Dialectics (2026); terms follow the glossary. The Tibetan is the Sakya Kabum text (ས་སྐྱ་བཀའ་འབུམ་, vol. ད). Rivals’ words are in double quotes and everything outside the quotes is Sakya Paṇḍita’s. Who is speaking is added in square brackets to the root’s own “if you say” (or “you may say”, where the answer refutes the claim) or “so they say”.

On the treatise as a whole, see Pramāṇayuktanidhi; for a lecture commentary on this chapter, see Khenpo Sodargye on chapter 3.

༈ །།རང་མཚན་འཛིན་པ་རྟོག་མེད་དེ། །སྤྱི་འཛིན་པ་ནི་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན། །དེ་ལ་རང་མཚན་དངོས་པོ་སྟེ། །སྤྱི་ནི་དངོས་པོར་གྲུབ་པ་མེད།

What apprehends the specifically characterised phenomenon is non-conceptual; what apprehends the universal1 is conceptual cognition. Of these, the specifically characterised phenomenon is an entity; the universal is not established as an entity.2

།རྫས་དང་ལྡོག་པ་སྤྱི་བྱེ་བྲག །སྒྲུབ་དང་གཞན་སེལ་རྟོག་མི་རྟོག །གཞན་དག་རྣམ་གཞག་གཞན་དུ་འཆད། །ཁོ་བོ་གཞུང་བཞིན་འཆད་པར་འདོད།

Substance and distinguisher, universal and particular, affirmation and elimination of other3, conceptual and non-conceptual: others explain the system otherwise; I intend to explain it according to the treatises.4

།རྗེས་དཔག་དངོས་པོར་མི་འཛིན་པས། །དེ་ལ་རྫས་ཆོས་འཐད་མ་ཡིན། །སེལ་བ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་རྗེས་དཔག་ནི། །ལྡོག་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་གྲུབ་པར་བཞེད།

Since inference does not apprehend [its object] as an entity, a substantial phenomenon is not tenable for it. Because inference is exclusion5, [its object] is held to be established6 by way of the distinguisher.7

།གཞན་དང་རང་གི་དངོས་པོ་ལས། །ལྡོག་པར་བྱེད་པ་སྤྱི་བྱེ་བྲག

What is distinguished from the entities of other [classes] and of its own [class] is [respectively] the universal and the particular.8

།ཐད་ཀ་དང་ནི་གོང་མ་ཡི། །སྤྱི་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་གཉིས་གཉིས་ཡོད། །ཐད་ཀའི་བྱེ་བྲག་རྫས་ཐ་དད། །གོང་མའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གཅིག་པ་བཀག

There are two [kinds] each of universal and particular: the horizontal and the vertical. Horizontal particulars are different substances; for vertical particulars, being one is negated.9

།ཁ་ཅིག་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་ཞེས་ཟེར།

“[Universal and particular] are different”, some say.10

།ཐ་དད་སྣང་རུང་མེད་པས་ཁེགས།

[However,] being different is excluded by the absence of what should appear.11

།ཁ་ཅིག་རྫས་གཅིག་ཡིན་ཞེས་ཟེར།

“[They] are one substance”, some say.12

།རྫས་གཅིག་ན་ཡང་སྣང་རུང་མིན།

[However,] even if they are one substance, [the universal] should appear [but does] not.13

།ཡུལ་དུས་རྣམ་པ་འགལ་བ་ཡི། །བྱེ་བྲག་སྤྱི་གཅིག་དང་འབྲེལ་ན། །སྐྱེ་འཇིག་ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་ཏུ་འགྱུར། །མིན་ན་གཅིག་ལ་ཆ་གཉིས་འགལ།

If particulars contradictory in place, time and aspect are related to one universal, their arising and disintegration would become one in nature. If not, it is contradictory for one [substance] to have two parts.14

།སྤྱི་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་རྫས་གཅིག་ན། །ཡན་ལག་ཅན་ཡང་ཇི་ལྟར་དགག

If universal and particular are one substance, how then could the whole15 be refuted?16

།དབང་པོའང་རྟོག་བཅས་ཉིད་དུ་ཐལ།

It would follow that even [consciousness based on] the sense faculty is conceptual.17

།འགལ་བ་ཀུན་ཀྱང་རྫས་གཅིག་འགྱུར།

All contradictory [things] too would become one substance.18

།བྱེ་བྲག་རེ་རེ་དང་འབྲེལ་པའི། །སྤྱི་ཡང་དུ་མ་ཡོད་ཅེ་ན།

If you [early Tibetan logicians]19 say, “There are also many universals, related to each particular”,

།མཚན་ཉིད་མི་འགྲུབ་དགག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི། །རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པའང་འཇིག་པར་འགྱུར།

then the definition [of the universal] would not be established, and the system of negation and affirmation would collapse too.20

།མཚན་ཉིད་མཚུངས་པའི་སྤྱི་གཅིག་དང༌། །བྱེ་བྲག་རྫས་གཅིག་ཡིན་ནོ་ལོ།

“A single universal of similar definition and the particulars are one substance”, so [the Tibetan logicians]21 say.

།མཚུངས་པ་རྟོག་པས་སྦྱར་བ་ཡིན། །རྟོག་པའི་བློ་ཆོས་དོན་ལ་མེད། །དོན་ལ་འདྲ་བ་ཡོད་ན་ནི། །སྔོན་མེད་མཐོང་ནའང་འདྲ་བར་འགྱུར།

[However,] similarity is joined together by conceptual cognition, and a mental phenomenon of conceptual cognition does not exist in the object. If resemblance existed in the object, then even on seeing what had not [been seen] before, [it] would resemble [others].22

།མཚུངས་ལ་དངོས་པོ་གཅིག་མི་སྲིད། །གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་ལ་སྤྱི་སྒྲ་མེད། །བློ་ལ་སྤྱི་གཅིག་མ་ཤར་ན། །མཚུངས་པར་རྟོགས་ཀྱང་སྤྱིར་མི་རུང༌།

For what is similar, being one entity is impossible, and for what is not one, the word ‘universal’ does not [apply]. If a single universal has not appeared to the mind, then even if [things] are conceived23 as similar, it is not fit to be a universal.24

།ཕྱོགས་རེ་འདྲ་བ་ཀུན་ལ་ཡོད། །ཐམས་ཅད་འདྲ་བ་གང་ནའང་མེད།

Partial resemblance exists in all [things]; complete resemblance exists nowhere.25

།རིགས་པའི་རྒྱལ་པོས་གསུངས་པ་ཡི། །རྣམ་གཞག་དང་ཡང་འགལ་བར་སྣང༌།

[These views] also appear26 to contradict the system taught by the King of Reasoning.27

།དེ་མིན་རང་བཞིན་ལས་ལྡོག་པ། །དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་ལ་གྲུབ་པ་དེ། །སེལ་བའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན་རང་མཚན་དུ། །འཁྲུལ་པ་དེ་ལ་དགག་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད།

What is distinguished from the nature of what is not that, and is established for all entities, is the universal of exclusion; on that, mistaken for a specifically characterised phenomenon, negation and affirmation are performed.28

།གལ་ཏེ་དོན་ལ་སྤྱི་མེད་ན། །གཞན་སེལ་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་དངོས་མེད་ལ། །གྲུབ་ཀྱང་དོན་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་ཕྱིར། །ཐ་སྙད་ཐམས་ཅད་འཇིག་ཅེ་ན།

If you say, “If there is no universal in the object, then, though elimination of other, a superimposition, is established as a non-entity, it is unrelated to the object, and so all conventions collapse”:29

།དོན་དང་སེལ་བ་གཅིག་ཉིད་དུ། །འཁྲུལ་ནས་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ན། །རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཐོབ་པ་ཙམ། །ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་འཐད་པ་ཡིན།

Having mistaken the object and exclusion as one and the same, one engages the object; and since the mere attainment of the specifically characterised phenomenon is valid cognition30, [this] is tenable.31

།ཐ་དད་སྤྱི་འདོད་འུག་ཕྲུག་པ། །རྫས་གཅིག་ཡིན་ཞེས་གྲངས་ཅན་པ། །གངས་ཅན་པ་རྣམས་དེ་རྗེས་འབྲང༌། །སེལ་བར་འདོད་པ་མཁས་པའི་ལུགས། །བསྡུ་བའི་ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པའོ།

The Owl School holds the universal to be different; “It is one substance”, say the Sāṃkhyas; those of the Land of Snow follow that [position]; holding it to be exclusion is the system of the wise.32 This is a summary verse.

།ཚད་མར་རིགས་པའི་གཏེར་ལས་སྤྱི་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་བརྟག་པའི་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ་གསུམ་པའོ།། །།

From the Treasury of Reasoning on Valid Cognition33, the third chapter: the examination of universal and particular.

Footnotes

  1. Sanskrit: specifically characterised phenomenon, svalakṣaṇa; universal, sāmānya. ↩

  2. The auto-commentary sorts the chapter’s terms into two sets of synonyms. Specifically characterised phenomenon, instance (གསལ་བ་), entity, substance, the distinguished (ལོག་པ་) and the ultimate name what can perform a function, stays unmixed with other substances, stands as cause and effect, and is what every person engages when taking up and setting aside. Universal, generally characterised phenomenon, elimination of other, distinguisher, preclusion, the mixed, relationship and the relative name what does not abide in the object, is not established as an entity, is not an object of the senses, is superimposed by conceptual cognition, and cannot perform a function. ↩

  3. Sanskrit anyāpoha. ↩

  4. The auto-commentary names the others as the Tibetans: sometimes they explain substance and affirmation, universal and distinguisher, as alike, sometimes as not; sometimes as phenomena of the mind, sometimes of the object; sometimes they prove the universal, sometimes refute it, so that “I have not seen their thinking reach the bottom”. Śākya Chokden counts Tsangnakpa among them. Sakya Paṇḍita’s own allocation: substance and universal are the objects, the conceptual and the non-conceptual the minds, and appearance and exclusion the modes of apprehension. ↩

  5. Sanskrit: inference, anumāna; exclusion, apoha. ↩

  6. Jamtsho’s critical edition reads གྲུབ་ (“established”) with a single witness, as does the Kabum text. The other witnesses and the auto-commentary have སྒྲུབ་ or a variant spelling of it (“prove”), which would give “inference is held to prove [its object] by way of the distinguisher”. ↩

  7. The auto-commentary first refutes the Tibetans’ definitions: substance is many distinguishers gathered inseparably on one basis, and a distinguisher is each gathered property taken separately, “like a coat of mail and its plates”. But distinguishers are superimposed by the mind and do not abide in the object, so there is nothing there to gather; if they did gather, this would be no different from the non-Buddhists’ many parts gathered inseparably in a single whole; and each definition depends on the other. Jamtsho finds a very similar passage, coat of mail included, in Tsurtön Zhönnu Sengge’s Lamp of Wisdom on Valid Cognition, which Sakya Paṇḍita is probably quoting or paraphrasing. The verse then refutes the substantial phenomenon: if inference measured substantial phenomena, then, since produced and impermanent are not different substances in a vase, realising that it is produced would be realising that it is impermanent. ↩

  8. Sakya Paṇḍita’s own definitions. In the auto-commentary, the universal is a superimposition appearing as a single distinguisher, turned away from the dissimilar class: to a conceptual cognition apprehending a vase, the instances of vase appear as turned away from non-vase. The particular is that same [superimposition], turned away also from within the similar class and appearing as two distinguishers together: to a conceptual cognition apprehending a tree, what appears as a śiṃśapā. Both are superimpositions. Jamtsho finds a very similar definition in Tsurtön’s Lamp of Wisdom. ↩

  9. The auto-commentary: śiṃśapā, sandalwood and the like, different substances gathered by direction, are horizontal particulars, and the universal related to them is the horizontal universal; the earlier and later moments of a single entity such as a śiṃśapā, gathered by time, are vertical particulars, and the universal related to them is the vertical universal. Horizontal particulars depend on direction, so they are different substances. Vertical particulars depend on time, and since the present is an entity while past and future are not, only their being one is negated. Śākya Chokden, approving Terawa (known as the new Dignāga), says the pair is not Sakya Paṇḍita’s own system, since the terms occur nowhere in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti: it is a Naiyāyika view reported in the Ornament of Valid Cognition (ཚད་མ་རྒྱན་), set out here in passing. Terawa himself says the Vaiśeṣikas coined the two terms. The image is literal. ཐད་ཀ is “level, side by side”: things that exist together in different places lie along one line. གོང་མ is “upper”, and in Tibetan what is above is also what is earlier, so the moments of one thing are stacked one on another. Jamtsho gives the Sanskrit as tiryaksāmānya and ūrdhvatā, and Monier-Williams glosses tiryañc “horizontal (opposed to ūrdhva)“. Sodargye’s Chinese has 异体 “distinct-substance” and 先后 “successive”, glosses drawn from the commentary. ↩

  10. The auto-commentary identifies them as the non-Buddhist Vaiśeṣikas. Their great universal, existence, and limited universals such as cowness pervade all their instances and are different substances from them: permanent, partless and non-appearing, and joined to the instances by the relationship of inherence, “like a herd of oxen tied to one rope”. ↩

  11. The reasoning is the nonapprehension of that which should appear. The auto-commentary: a universal other than instances such as [particular] trees is not established as an entity, since it is not observed although it should appear, like a rabbit’s horns; to be certain that something exists even though it could not appear would go much too far. ↩

  12. The auto-commentary names two parties. The Sāṃkhyas hold that the universal, primal substance (the three guṇas in equal balance), is present in particulars such as a vase as a single self, like fire and its heat. The Tibetans proclaim with one voice that a “mere tree” over śiṃśapā, sandalwood and the like, a “mere blue” over beryl and other blues, and a “mere ox” are one with their particulars, indivisible in substance and nature: “the Sāṃkhyas who hold this and the Tibetans agree in meaning”. Śākya Chokden says that from Cha-ba and Tsangnakpa to his own day all have agreed on this. The auto-commentary divides the one-substance view into three: one universal one with many particulars (refuted in the next five verses), many universals one with many particulars, and a universal of similarity. ↩

  13. Since universal and particular are one substance, when the particular appears, the universal, indivisible from it, should appear too; its nonapprehension refutes it (auto-commentary). ↩

  14. The auto-commentary: when one tree arises or perishes, if the tree-universal does not arise or perish, they are not one substance; if it does, trees of different places would arise in one place, trees of different times at one time and trees of different aspects in one aspect, and when one perished all would perish. It cites the Pramāṇaviniścaya: things differ only by having contradictory properties or different causes, and if that does not make them different, nothing differs from anything and everything becomes a single substance. ↩

  15. Sanskrit avayavin. ↩

  16. The arguments by which [Buddhists] refute a single whole pervading head, legs and the other parts (that what is related to many is not one; that when the hand moved the whole body would move; and those from being covered or uncovered, dyed or undyed) apply equally to a single universal (auto-commentary). Sodargye notes that the charge bites only on Buddhists, since a Sāṃkhya never refuted the whole: its target is the Tibetans. ↩

  17. A single substance has no part that appears and part that does not, so when the particular appears to a sense consciousness, the universal appears too, and that consciousness becomes conceptual (auto-commentary). To the reply that apprehending a conceptual generality is conceptual but apprehending a type-universal is not, the auto-commentary answers that to hold a type-universal not included in the conceptual generality is like holding an ocean that is not water: “the babble of one drunk on a bad teacher’s poison-water”. ↩

  18. Different things such as white and blue, and contradictories such as light and darkness, would all be one substance. Then wanting blue one would get white, wanting darkness light, wanting the universal the particular, and everything would fall into confusion (auto-commentary). ↩

  19. The auto-commentary says only “some”, who grant that there is no single universal but hold that on each particular, such as a śiṃśapā, there is a universal one in nature with it. Rongtön attributes the view to “some Tibetans” (བོད་འགའ་ཞིག་). ↩

  20. If there are many universals, the universal of śiṃśapā is a collection of two distinguishers, which makes it a particular, and the definition of the universal is not established. And establishing the particular śiṃśapā would not establish the universal of other trees, nor would excluding the universal of śiṃśapā exclude other trees, so the system of negation and affirmation collapses (auto-commentary). ↩

  21. In the auto-commentary, “some” accept neither one universal nor many, but hold that the universal in which śiṃśapā, sandalwood and the like are similar in definition, having branches and leaves, is one substance with the particulars. Śākya Chokden attributes the view to Tsangnakpa Tsöndrü Sengge; Sodargye, to the early Tibetan school of pramāṇa. ↩

  22. Putting resemblances together is conceptual cognition, so resemblance does not exist in the object. If it did, on seeing a ruby never seen before one would have to think that it resembles other rubies (auto-commentary). The auto-commentary cites the Pramāṇavārttika: those who apprehend resemblance are those who have seen both what resembles and what it resembles. ↩

  23. The Kabum text and the auto-commentary read རྟོགས་ (“realised”). Jamtsho’s critical edition reads རྟོག་ (“conceived”) and records no variant; the translation follows it. ↩

  24. The auto-commentary first reports a fallback: “Even if there is no similar universal in the object, why should there not be a universal that conceptual cognition apprehends as similar?” Śākya Chokden attributes it to Denbakpa Mawé Sengge, a disciple of Cha-ba. The answer: the word “similar” already indicates many phenomena, since a single phenomenon cannot be similar to that same one. To the further claim that apprehending as similar is itself the universal, even if nothing appears as one, the auto-commentary replies that one could no longer say “bring wood”, only “bring something like śiṃśapā, bring something like sandalwood”. ↩

  25. Because of differences of place, time and aspect, resemblance in every respect is nowhere possible. So pervasion too is not established through the resemblance of the smoke on the mountain pass and the smoke in the kitchen, but by conceiving them as one universal through elimination of other (auto-commentary). ↩

  26. Jamtsho’s critical edition adopts འགྱུར་ (“would contradict”) from one witness. The Kabum text, the auto-commentary and his other witnesses read སྣང་ (“appear”), which the translation keeps. ↩

  27. The auto-commentary answers from Dharmakīrti, quoting the Pramāṇavārttika: the mind of a universal is corrupted by a cause of error; the universal that is the word-object is imputed by conceptual cognition; the universal of impermanence and the like is a non-entity, and so not the sphere of the senses. Sodargye takes the King of Reasoning to be Dignāga and Dharmakīrti together. ↩

  28. Sakya Paṇḍita’s own position. Conceptual cognition, mistaken by nature, takes the universal and particular of elimination of other for the universal and particular of the object; on that [mistake] rests the system in which establishing the particular establishes the universal and excluding the universal excludes the particular (auto-commentary). ↩

  29. The auto-commentary spells out what would collapse: the reasoning of identical nature, by which establishing the particular establishes the universal; the nonapprehension of the pervader, by which excluding the universal excludes the particular; and with them every logical system and all worldly activity. ↩

  30. Sanskrit pramāṇa. ↩

  31. Conceptual cognition is mistaken by nature, so when it engages [its object] having mistaken elimination of other for the specifically characterised phenomenon, the mere attainment of the object accomplishes what valid cognition does. “Attainment” is just this: knowing, when one proceeds according to the negation or affirmation made, whether the object exists or not. Every other dispute resolves itself once elimination of other is understood, so none is stated here (auto-commentary). ↩

  32. The Owl School is the Vaiśeṣika, named after its founder’s epithet Ulūka, “owl”. Those of the Land of Snow are Cha-ba and his successors (Sodargye). Gorampa explains why they count as followers of the Sāṃkhyas: they do not say outright that the universal is an entity, but accept that it is one substance with entities. He also records Sakya Paṇḍita’s quip that those of the Land of Snow (གངས་ཅན་པ་) agree with the Sāṃkhyas (གྲངས་ཅན་), and the Sakyapa is at odds with Kapila (སེར་སྐྱ་). ↩

  33. Sanskrit title: Pramāṇayuktanidhi. The Kabum text reads ཚད་མར་, a slip for ཚད་མ་ (auto-commentary; Jamtsho’s edition). ↩

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